I wouldn't call it necessarily infinite but unbounded, but ironically by virtue of our own limitations - our inability to be aware of the boundaries. Wittgenstein put it pretty well near the end of Tractatus. It is analogous to vision - which is again a strong, perhaps one of the strongest...
There is no subject who experience besides the experience itself.
[1] If a subject directly experiences the experience in front of it, it is redundant, because we are agreeing that the experience is already present, therefore by definition it is already being experienced.
[2] If a subject...
Platonic forms seemed to be getting somewhere to the idea of forming a generic concept and abstraction. One may say the generic idea of chair is in-itself somewhat platonic. But I don't think there is much more to it; nothing to warrant a literal metaphysical plane of existence to ground...
Honestly, I haven't read much about Sellars; I just found him appealing from the surface after hearing about him from other sources I read about.
I didn't get the impression that he was advocating knowledge of immediate senations -- rather he seemed to denying that we have immediate senations...
It may still be difficult or impossible to have transformative effects of properly cultivated mystical experiences through mere philosophical reasoning or reflection. I think one can get similar conceptual conclusions (to ideas induced by certain mystical experiences) through philosophical...
Not sure what's your point. We already know induction is not like deduction. The negation of the inductive conclusion is often logically consistent with the observations.
The proof also seems trivial because you already assume that the negation of the induced conclusion Ci is consistent with...
You cannot program a robot to experience heat as 'pain'. You can program it to perform behaviors similar to what one would do in pain. You cannot even make it experience heat or the qualitative warmth of heat, you can only program it to record some quantitative information representing degree of...
I don't think this is necessarily the 'correct' conception. There is still a deep sense in which determinism does imply lack of any real freedom - or at least true moral responsibility. Philosophers try to associate 'reason' and action followed by 'reason' with freedom, but I find 'reason' to be...
Indeterminancy has more to do with Bell Inequality violation. It follows from the experiment that there can no local hidden variables to pre-determine how a particle can act or interact. However, non-local hidden variables are still possible (which is still a deterministic case). Some finding...
it means normies who aren't in harmony with the Tao rely on artificially constructed mechanical concepts of morality and kindness before it gets even worse./s
There seems to be a substantial difference in the psychological nature of ordinary intuitions. Both perspectival possession (having things in perspective), and personal possession (feeling of personally having the thing) are forms of possession. Linguistic conventions - "saying my thoughts are...
Unfortunately couldn't find any of his books online (amazon says out of print).
You may also find AC Mukherjee (https://jaygarfield.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/ac-mukerji.pdf) interesting (though I haven't read him). I found some of his books from archive.
The kyoto school philosophers - "the...
I don't really have any idea about what Pierce or Sellars was exactly up to. I haven't really read their stuff. I don't really have the mental resource these days to go through all that Piercian neologisms. They are on the reading list, but I have many other grounds to cover before reaching...
"One implication of the unending nature of the interpretation of appearances through infinite sequences of signs is that Peirce cannot be any type of epistemological foundationalist or believer in absolute or apodeictic knowledge. He must be, and is, an anti-foundationalist and a fallibilist...
But if you read what the original ancient skeptics (Pyrrhonians) themselves had to say ....they justified their actions exactly in terms of how nature simply necessitates them to act in certain ways. They followed common sense, convention, appearances, and the forces of nature. What their...
Regarding epistemology, I still find the idea behind Cartesian Doubt appealing.
I am not very updated on cutting edge epistemology, but personally, for now, I have settled with something which I may call "epistemology based on doubt".
Basically, I rank beliefs and ideas based on how difficult...
I don't know much about Descartes beyond meditations, but there is a charitable interpretation of Descartes according to which all Descartes meant to affirm was the undeniable presence of a self however short or long, enduring, or not whatever it is.
Thoughts are also perceptions. Though the...
what is everything that you can tell me about everything you know barring things that will not be too interesting if I were to know them, where 'thing' is to be conceived as loosely as possible?
ing
In meditations, he avoided using 'therefore'. His main point was that 'I' is something he could not coherently doubt. Upon more charitable interpretation, he was affirming the primordial intuitive sense of being that cannot be reasonably doubted. He didn't really necessarily meant it had to...
I was just going on a tangent.
It was a jab against those who assign some form of quasi-logical or metaphysical necessity to God using things like PSR.
From what I have seen logical necessities seems to only belong to relational ideas and if-then claims and mathematical claims "given axiom...
I am still talking about logical impossibility of logical necessity of being. And I haven't made any assumptions about actual possibility to do that as far as I am aware. So where in my original post or in my second post did I assume logical possibility has anything to do with actual...
It is logically possible that black is white when looking at it only syntactically. Following common conventions about what is black and white - we can say something purely black is not white and vice versa. Given that as a premise if we say if something being purely black and purely white at...
Where am I equating logical possibility with actual possibility? I only spoke of logical possibility, logical necessity and logical impossibility, all of which are connected. I never mentioned anything about actual possibility.
There is no reason for the creator of meaning to have meaning. But for any meaning to not end up in meaninglessness must itself be supported by some further meaning.
By necessary (in necessary being), I meant logically necessary.
By definition, if not-X is logically possible, X is not logically...
AFAIK, objective knowledge isn't denied by the majority of philosophers at least in analytical circles. And most aren't epistemological nihilists either.
That's not sufficient. The creator of meaning itself must have some meaning to be. And the applied purpose itself should be something purposeful.
So you have two option, either the chain of meaning ends somewhere (making the whole chain unsupported), or the chain of meaning continues infinitely...
@The Grey Man I found this guy: John M. Taurek
He basically publicly published this one paper: "Should the numbers count?"
He is saying a lot of same things as you. It also helped me understand you better.
You may find some sense of soliditary in his paper...
It's better understood in the context of ontological arguments for God (like Anselm).
The arguments usually go like how God must necessarily exist by definition and stuff (not going to expand). The vacuity of existence as predicate arguments are often used to point out the logical flaws in such...
You can ask Moore ( a non-skeptic) the same thing. Moore seems to think they are different. And he also dedicated the first portions of his paper "proof of external world" dedicated to differentiating objects in space and objects that can be met in space or something like that.
Sure; I wasn't arguing for or against the merits of definitions. I am not even sure how to exactly determine the merits of a definition in general beyond checking for some simple measurew. But using a conventional definition is easier if for the very fact that it is conventional - language...
I think it can be used in multiple contexts, but there may not be as many room for interpreting it - as in interpreting what it meant to be in its original context. AFAIK, it was pretty clearly used to promote the idea of forms - how those who can grasp the forms that underlie sensory phenomenon...
Colloquial dictionaries aren't usually a proper source for more sophisticated concepts if they are to be used in more formal contexts.
It is a common standard to include "null hypothesis" in the set of hypotheses - it's not like just one eccentric PhD holder is mutilating the definition.
But...
As far as I remember, Moore did fabricate a story. He didn't simply say that he has a hand in his experience, but that he has a veridical perception (by veridical he meant it's not a hallucination or a dream or even one from the phenomenal world of idealism) - i.e for him his hand is something...
I didn't know that that's the standard definition of hypothesis - that hypothesis can't ever be about an absence of some entity or relation.
Do you have a source that shows that your conventions are standard?
I searched wikipedia. Since not everyone may find Wikipedia to be appealing, I went...
This site uses cookies to keep you logged in if you register.
By continuing to use this site, you are consenting to our use of cookies. We have no personalisation nor analytics --- especially no Google.