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The idea of philosophical zombie asks us to image beings who don't experience any qualia despite being similar in their manifest aspects (their behaviors and any physical structures -- any observable neurology). If you buy the logical coherence of philosophical zombie, then it's not clear why...
Strictly there isn't much you can do with logic. With deduction you just make inferences from premises; so you can infer any bullshit by setting the premises as any bullshit. In most complex situations, some premise have to do a lot of heavy lifting. For example, a trivial deduction would : P1...
I don't feel like dichotomies play as much of a central role in Philosophical Daoism as much as it's made out in pop-culture. Daoism points towards the necessity of contrasts from opposing ends for dichotomies to survive but it doesn't seem to say everything is dual or anything to that extent...
I didn't said God is not unified. There is a fragmentation within the unity but not violating the unity. It's not an either-or. I meantioned that there is oneness behind multiplicity, but that doesn't take away the fact of internal fragmentation, dissociation, and suffering. That I have to even...
I didn't mean to demean anyone, but deflate those who wants to stand above others and those who appears as "God" to others as if they are "The God" in some "exclusive" sense rather than being manifestations in God like everyone else.
By evil, I mean, it seems that the logos expresses itself in...
God is insane and blind. One behind the multiplicitiy yet with fragmented personalities . The source of all good and the prime evil. Infinite but expresses itself in broken finity. Don't let any particular embodied (or formless) particularized entity fool you otherwise with their saintly...
From what I can understand,
If you accept PSR, we get to necessatarianism. Something is true, then, because it had to be true (there are no conceivable other way; the reason we can conceive other ways, because we are half-backed creatures who can't have the full picture). Furthermore, the only...
By ontological monism I meant substance monism. Vedanta is committed mainly to substance monism. To that extent it is comparable to materialism or idealism. It simply goes more radical by, perhaps, denying subject-object duality and substantial quantitative plurarity of non-dual-subject-objects...
In vedanta, there is no ontological duality between reality and appearance. The appearance is the expression of the one and grounded in it. But the apparent still exists even if not independently and the apparent can obscure its own true nature. When we speak of appearance and reality...
Vedanta (and possibly neo-platonism) is about ontological non-dualism (or perhaps phenomenological non-dualism), not epistemic non-dualism. They don't care to resolve epistemic dualism (truth vs falsehood, appearance vs reality) because they are, most likely, not committed to absolute...
Overall, I don't see any real need of a conflict here.
According to problem of evil, there cannot be a benevolent all-powerful diety to take care of us. Insofar there is no such of diety, the POE remains undefeated. Some of the Theodicies can make it weaker, but they kind of goes neither here...
What causes privation or ignorance then?
(1) Many accounts hold God as the support for causality itself - it is pure act which provides the power for any potential to be actualized. The cycle of samsara - ignorance and suffering cannot be maintained without God's active support.
(2) The...
While picking and choosing may be necessary, it needs to be a "principled" picking and choosing. The difficultiy is in finding that said principle; and we have to be very careful here. We cannot go on and say "we choose this, because it fits our narrative".
A better approach may be to "collect"...
I'm not too sure about perenialism, or that "all religions are one at an esoteric level"
While I, perhaps, do believe that there are mystical states accessible to all humans given the right conditions and there are several commonalities among the more mystical sides of all (or most) religions...
Yes, otherwise there wouldn't be much point to Buddhism and its practices.
Buddhism isn't necessarily about removing possibility of all forms of suffering in all senses permanently. It is about removing a deeper form of existential suffering. Even Arhats after Nirvana would have "residues"...
Arhats who acheive Nirvana manages to find a way in between being a full-fledged sentient self and a rock - they manage to become a sentient rock, so to say, having sentience, but being impersonal --- more like a rock than a human. That is not to say they would lose personality and emotions...
The sense of being an ego - a subject of experience - should be a priori, yes, because it's hard to see how that can be derived from sense-data whether you come accross the gaze of other people or not. Rather the root of this sense and idea is probably an intrinsic predisposition in our...
There is a difficulty in thinking in terms of "I" as the unmanifest looker that look towards experiences. The difficulty becomes clearer when we ask what does it exactly means to "look", is the "I" looking at "experiences" (if if the experiences are already happening, what is the need of looking...
The person can be reduced to a story imputed over interconnected impersonal elements. But yes, we can go towards a more "participatory sort of realism"
Neither do I see binary logic here nor do I see non-atomic propositions.
Your examples seems to be either parital ("i am right" - about what?) to exactly translate into a complete proposition to evaluate its atomicity or quite atomic "God exists".
Further more none of your posts has to do...
Last I heard, it has lack of empirical support. There are updated versions of these kind of things. But I don't really like these kind of categorizations all too much. Lot of these categorizations don't really seemed principled or rigorous, rather something intuitive made up classes which may or...
Just because you can consider temporality as a spatial block doesn't mean time is metaphysically a spatial block. If change is real, time is dynamic - determinism only implies that all the change are completely determined to be exactly as it occurs, by prior causes.
That's not necessarily...
Not 'seeing' thoughts, doesn't mean not 'knowing' them. When you deliberately conceptualize a red balloon you should also 'know' that you are thinking of a red balloon whether you 'see' or 'not'.
There is still something it is like to have a thought - even when it is not visual, auditory...
I never denied that whatever appears do appear at some level. But, whether it's aprioric forms, or forms influenced by empirical signals, the point is that they make things appear in a certain way - potentially biased by the forms. The forms can change how the appearances are comprehended by...
Space and time are not formal conditions of our intuitions, they ARE (pure) intuitions if we follow Kant.
"
In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms
of sensible intuition as principlesa of a priori cognition, namely space
and time, with the assessment of which we...
Yes, he started dry. But he had bigger plans than just making generalized statements. Unfortunately, he became mad and died, metaphorically (or may be literally; it's not important).
We don't even know, if the pre-interpretation empirical signal (stimuli) even appears at all. I suspect, before interpretation, there is no consciousness in the traditional sense. Consciousness as we know it is formed from the interection of the mind with the stimuli - and within that...
You don't have to be sure about anything except that appearances exist and 'I am' and stuffs like that. The image of rope need not be any more real either, chances are it's not - though ideally it would be a faithful representative that is good enough to interact it. But in practice, instead of...
When he said 'I am' he didn't invoked God. He was certain that he exist not because God makes it certain, but because to doubt existence is to affirm it --- in essence, it is impossible to even doubt being. Next he try to figure out the principle or feature behind certain knowledge - eg. I am...
You are assuming a clean cut between appearances and interpretation, which I have been arguing against. Most of the illusions I provided examples of were examples where interpretetions manifest as quasi-appearances (you think they appear in a manner in which they don't - they appear at shallow...
Even God cannot justify flawless reasoning, for all you know God may not provide a sufficiently good faculty to man, either because God is not good, or perhaps because there is a good reason to lack capacity to reason. And even to reason about how God must be good or how giving a reasoning...
All that 'appears' like a distinction without a difference to me.
Epistemic merit has much to do with practical approach (which belief we weigh more, and base our actions upon). Failing to make proper predictions, or making predictions contradicted by the more enriched appearances, seems to...
I already did accept that what appears, truly appears even if only at the surface level experience, even if only as a conceptual fabrication even lacking the rich phenomenal qualities one 'thinks' it has. As such you can call them veridical if you want.
But I don't see what the point here is...
What is this "I" and what kind of relationship does it have with exeprience?
There is the at least locally spatio-temporally united experience qua consciousness, but where is the "I" beyond it that 'possess' the consciousness?
If all that "I" means is the specific reflexivity of the specific...
Another point I can make is that not much data is actually registered from experience whether that's because phenomenological experience itself is much poorer than we ordinarily think, or that's because even if phenomenology is RICH, the cognition that registers aspects of it in immediate memory...
The surface experience is just what it appears to be, by definition. One doesn't have to resort to metaphysical speculations for that. I am not denying that consciousness have both synchronic and diachronic unity for normal people at the surface experiential level. But I am restricting the claim...
The distinction is epistemology-phenomenology vs metaphysics.
To say experience appears to be simultaneious is an epistemic claim (how it appears), to say it IS simultaneious is a metaphysical claim (how it truly is in itself).
It may appear to an instantly created clone replacing the original...
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