The Grey Man
το φως εν τη σκοτια φαινει
Is There a Problem of Evil? - The Matheson Trust
Marco Pallis “Divine grace always leaves us this one hope; God who now seems so distant is ever close at hand—‘closer than your jugular vein,’ as the Koran has it. The Tree of Life is standing in this room, as certainly as it stood in Eden; it is a pity if we will not use

Last year, I mentioned having asked some colleagues of mine a question similar to the Hardy Question:
What I did not mention at that time was that one or two of my colleagues, rather than answering the question directly, had used it as an occasion to explain why they did not believe in a 'higher power' or, at least, that they did not believe in a benevolent God. It seems that not a few people find the idea of an omnibenevolent deity incredible given the undeniable fact of human suffering. They are Schopenhauers bitterly contesting Leibniz's apologetic argument that our existence as 'the best of all possible worlds.'
If we were to conduct the most hardened and callous optimist through hospitals, infirmaries, operating theatres, through prisons, torture-chambers, and slave-hovels, over battlefields and to places of execution; if we were to open to him all the dark abodes of misery, where it shuns the gaze of cold curiosity, and finally were to allow him to glance into the dungeon of Ugolino where prisoners starved to death, he too would certainly see in the end what kind of a world is this meilleur des mondes possibles.
In philosophical terms, the problem of evil is that rock which has shipwrecked many an attempt to reconcile empirical knowledge of suffering with the conviction that all is yet well in God. The problem is, in fact, insoluble if the following assumptions are granted:
- evil exists; and
- God is the cause of evil.
- either God is unable to prevent evil or
- God permits evil or
- God is neither able nor willing to prevent evil.
Is the position of the religious defensible against Epicurean criticism? In other words, is it possible to deny that God is the cause of evil without denying his omnipotence? Marco Pallis thought so (see link above). Pallis belonged to the Traditionalist School, which follows what it calls the sophia perennis (exemplified by Platonism and Advaita Vedanta in particular) in asserting that evil is at once a privation of goodness and an ignorance of one's essential identity with God, who is the Good Itself. God is therefore not the cause of evil, but he does not prevent it either: according to the Traditionalists, the problem is not evil in itself, but the fragmentary egoistic perspective that makes evil possible by obscuring our divine nature.
1 Corinthians 4:7 said:For who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?
In allegorical terms, the Serpent and the temptation to eat the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil could not but be in the Garden, else the Garden would be as perfect as God himself, nor does Adam's Fall change the fact that he was made in God's image. Though he toils in foreign lands, yet is Adam stamped with the memory of his true home.
1 Corinthians 13:10 said:But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.
Frithjof Schuon said:When the sun rises, the night has never been.