Thanks for sharing. It wasn`t that long ago since I had the pleasure of seeing him in person, though I didn`t know a lot about him at the time. I haven`t read this before, but I was somewhat acquainted with parts of it through other sources. It certainly deserves a second and a third reading.
The subject of phenomenological experience or, as Chalmers put it, simply experience, has been a heated topic ever since Nagel`s paper "what is it like to be a bat" and I think it`s a pretty damn interesting subject. I agree with Chalmers in recognizing it as the hard problem of consciousness and that there is an explanation gap between neuroscience (or, broadly, physics) and qualitative experience. But I`m not, at least at first glance, sure that Chalmers have found the solution in treating conscious experience as a primitive, though I`ve got to admit that I`m intrigued by the view. The biggest problem I have with it is that one must acknowledge a dualism of some kind (even if Chalmers variety seems to me fairly innocent (which, ironically, might make it even more dangerous)). Namely that there is something more to consciousness than what can be known by empirical investigation of the neural complex alone. Apparently, we need to have a fundamental, nonreductionist notion of (phenomenological) experience and discover psychophysical principles that bridges (phenomenological) experience with the physical/functional descriptions given by neuroscience. I`m not in any position to evaluate such an undertaking, but, for what it`s worth, I`m not all that convinced that it would fare any better in our collective effort at uncovering the nature of consciousness than a neuroscience that doesn`t recognize phenomenological experience as some special kind of phenomena that escapes empirical research. After all, as he himself admits, it seems unavoidable that a large part of the overall method of discovering the psychophysical principles would consist of us having to be speculative arm-chair phenomenologists. Having said that, in examining consciousness it`s very likely that it`s unavoidable for us having to rely on at least some amount of introspection, and to use it in tandem with the study of brain states.
I`m interested in getting a clearer sense of Chalmers dualism (which I probably will acquire upon further reading). I`m sure he would agree that every quale is dependent upon having a physical realizer and that he believes in psycho-neural/physical supervenience (that there is no change in the qualitative character of an experience without there being a corresponding change in the brain), but what about the nature of the quale`s themselves? It seems to me that he has got to say that they aren`t physical. That they, in some sense, are non-physical properties. If not, why can`t neuroscience ever figure out what this mess we call consciousness (or experience) is?