Shattering Hume's Guillotine

[Absurdity]

Begin huge quote-wall:

People who act dishonorably in one context are likely to act dishonorably in another. People who use force improperly in one context are likely to use force improperly in another. This is both obviously true, and easily verified from everyday life.

We judge deeds in order to judge men. Since our judgments of men can be wise or unwise, plainly then our judgments of deeds can be correct or incorrect.

It is often difficult to judge a deed. This does not mean that such judgments are merely matters of taste.

Suppose we wish to enter into a contract with one of two men, either Bob or Dave. Both Bob and Dave have in the past broken a major promise, though under very different circumstances, both Bob and Dave have killed a man, though under very different circumstances. We need to decide which one is most likely to keep his word and least likely to harm us.

Bob promised to do certain things in return for a large sum of money. He failed to do the things he promised, and he later killed the person who gave him the money in a surprise attack.

Dave promised to do certain things, in return for not having his arms and legs broken. He failed to do the things he promised, and he later killed the person who threatened him in a surprise attack.

Obviously we should contract with Dave, not with Bob. But why is it obvious? How do we know this? How can we know it? How are we capable of knowing it?

Dave's actions were different from Bob's actions because Dave's actions were morally different from Bob's actions.

Consciously or unconsciously we evaluated the actions of Bob and Dave, and concluded that Bob's actions were gravely evil, and therefore were a sign that he was likely to do similarly evil things in future. Dave's actions were not gravely evil. The issue was not killing or breaking promises, but wrongful killing and breaking of promises. We concluded that Dave's actions were different from Bob's actions because they were morally different. We concluded that our intended relationship with Dave would be different from the relationship he had with the person he killed because it would be morally different, and that if we were to have that relationship with Bob it would be morally similar to the relationship Bob had with the person that he killed.

Someone who came to a different conclusion would not merely have different arbitrary subjective values about what constituted evil, as one person might like chocolate ice-cream and another person vanilla ice-cream. A person who came to a different conclusion, who thought that Dave and Bob's deeds were similar, would not merely have different subjective tastes, he would be deluded or foolish. He would be wrong. He would make incorrect and unwise decisions about who to deal with, who to associate with, who to contract with, and what contracts should be about.

In correctly concluding that Bob's actions were morally different from Dave's actions and that therefore we should contract with Dave, we consciously or unconsciously used various principles of natural law

(I am using the phrase “natural law” in the sense that Thomas Aquinas and John Locke used it natural rights and obligations — that law which is rightly enforceable in a state of nature, not in the sense of physical law — for a discussion of natural law see Natural Law and Natural Rights). The same phrase has two meanings that are now understood as being very different. This causes much confusion, which we usually avoid by using the phrase “natural rights and obligations” instead of the phrase “natural law”. Unfortunately that phrase cuts us off from the past discussions of this question, which was invariably phrased in terms of law rather than rights. It also makes an artificially great distinction between natural law and customary law. In avoiding one confusion, we foster another.)

Among the principles of natural law that we used, consciously or unconsciously, were that contracts should be honored, but that a contract should be for value or it is no contract - that coercion is wrong, but that self defense is right. If someone arbitrarily assumed different principles of natural law, he would make incorrect predictions about people's behavior; he would be less accurate when he attempted to predict the future behavior of Bob and Dave. If someone arbitrarily assumed incorrect principles of natural law, he would be making incorrect assumptions about the nature of man.

For example if he falsely assumed that self defense was merely another form of coercion, as has been claimed in debates on the right to keep and bear arms, he would falsely conclude that Dave was as inclined to violence as Bob. If he also falsely assumed that a contract need not be for value, as has often been asserted in debates on the social contract, then he would falsely conclude that a relationship of trust existed between Dave and the extortionist, and would therefore falsely conclude that Dave was untrustworthy.

We can easily and correctly infer moral truths from facts about the world, and can easily and correctly infer facts about the world from moral truths. Everyone does this all the time, and those who claim it is impossible to do this, do it as much as anyone else.

To predict the behavior of inanimate objects we use, consciously or subconsciously, a theory of such objects. To predict the behavior of other men, we use, consciously or subconsciously, a theory of mind.

Such a theory must contain the categories of good and evil. A theory without these categories will fail to predict other people's behavior in precisely those cases where it is most important to us to predict their behavior.

Because any reasonably accurate theory of mind needs to employ these categories, and because deeds need to be attributed to these categories reasonably accurately, good and evil are true universals, just as “man” or “tiger” are true universals. It is possible to be wrong in our judgments. We need to make our judgments objectively correct. We can achieve judgments that are mostly accurate, though there is no simple mechanical rule for doing so. The fact that it is sometimes difficult to determine what is the true judgment is no reason to think that such judgments cannot be true or false.

To predict men's future conduct from their past conduct, we need to categorize their deeds, in order to say that one deed is like another and one deed is unlike another, to say that one person is like another and one person is unlike another. The most important category is moral.

In order to predict that conduct that is most important and most difficult to predict, we need to judge men and deeds as just or unjust, fair or unfair, good or bad.

Plainly therefore there exist correct and incorrect categorizations. The categories are not arbitrary. Arbitrary categories are not useful in predicting conduct. Correct categories are plainly useful in predicting conduct, and must be based on sound theories of men and the world, rather than arbitrarily created from nothing.

What about Hume and the is/ought gap?

Hume's argument presupposes that normative concepts are based on “ought”. This does not seem to be how people use such words in practice.

Approximately half the uses of “ought” in everyday speech are clearly non normative (“you ought to bottle the beer when the fermentation starts to slow”), and we have no way of telling a normative use of “ought” from a non normative use of “ought” except by appeal to our already existent intuitive knowledge of what is normative. Thus a definition of “normative” in terms of “ought” is simply false, and thus will lead to false conclusions.

In practice people mostly use normative words not to command, but to justify fearing someone, to justify taking some unpleasant action against someone, or to argue that they themselves should not be feared, to present someone else's conduct as part of a pattern that predicts a likelihood of causing harm, or to present their own conduct as part of a pattern that predicts the opposite.

The argument presented here assumes that normative concepts are not based on “ought” but on “evil”. “Evil” in the sense of “suffering harm” is uncontroversially objective, in the case of the more extreme, obvious, and direct forms of harm, such as the violent death of Bob's creditor. This proof takes us from the uncontroversial objectivity of “suffering evil”, as Bob's creditor and Dave's extortionist suffered, to the controversial objectivity of “doing evil”, as Bob did to his creditor, and Dave did not do to his extortionist. It shows us why some deeds, though far from all deeds, that objectively inflict evil are objectively evil deeds.

Source

This still has me reeling a bit. Discussion welcomed.

 

[Cherry Cola]

Damn this was good stuff. Don't quite know what to discuss, this is something that you'd wish everyone could just have in their bag to begin with because it would effectively combat flimsy boring relativists and sceptics.

I'm sure issues arise in determining just what is there, but at least it's being there is made evidently clear here. Not that biology hadn't already proved that it had to be there; this is just a better way of putting it. Anyway the way he dealt with Hume was very neat.

In the end though as long as moral truths are not found interwoven in the very fabric of the cosmos; of being, then the is ought problem remains, philosophically speaking. But that's just one the issues you have to deal with when encapsuling the universe in the human sphere I guess.

Edit: This reminds me I should read that stuff you posted last time you made a similar thread, I deemed it "interesting" but was too lazy to actually focus a little bit and read it through. This happens far too often.

 

[Analyzer]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentation_ethics

 

[Cherry Cola]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentation_ethics

If it is in human nature to make societal laws of what they perceive to be natural laws (metaphorically applying micro-morals to a macro enviroment, our intuitive moral domain is designed for reproduction in an enviroment of small tribes not the globalized contemporary world) isn't it mildly uninteresting to speak of libertarian anarchism in the same sense as it is of any other utopia even if it is a sound one?

Before we can adjust our nature we need it mapped, and while we map it we're better of adjusting our laws in accordance with what we know as we accumulate new knowledge seeing as it allows us a greater degree control over ourselves.

 

[Analyzer]

Nature is already at a state of anarchy. What if you looked at earth from the outside. There are no borders or laws, the natural laws and physical systems that determine the course of events are all decentralized.

The issue with libertarianism is the belief that the "natural order" has too many variables and uncertainties that designing a perfect system will always be incomplete. So with this it's the antithesis of utopia. Most libertarians assert that the respect for property rights is the only consistent and rational way of organizing society, as argumentation ethics, the homesteading principle, and other economic theories show. Now you might say this is utopian in itself, but its more of a respect or understanding for the failures of calculation and organization.

This is where Hume and relativistic theories fall short. Relativists believe everything is up for grabs and society should be viewed as a never ending lab experiment. Will humans and the idea of consciousnesses ever come to a point where it can be isolated like atoms are in a controlled lab experiment, ensuring a full understanding? Even in the case of a technological singularity, uncertainties about nature will just become bigger problems. This is why I believe rationalism and the influence of Kantian/Lockean/Hoppean property right theories has a strong foundation, that can be further developed.

 

[Brontosaurie]

moral "ought" propositions are readily translatable to factual "is" propositions. the remaining discrepancy between different personal values is negligible in the context of generalized ethics imo: we all strive to survive and prosper and harness our abilities and make the best of the world. at least we all benefit from that.

hume's [whatever you call it], the is-ought-problem, is such a drag. obviously a mere corollary to the problem of certainty, yet by many taken for some mystery that prevents any rational discourse pertaining to ethics from taking place. too bad everything is ethics. it's peculiar that one particular nonsensical resort to skepticism should enjoy common acceptance just because hume wrote it.

hume was a rather funny jolly guy tho, judging from his autobiography.

(not debating anything in the article, with which i basically agree)

 

[Coolydudey]

That is, IMO, one of the more stupid things I've read... How does an example about two men with different personalities from whose actions we can infer their priorities and states of mind lead to moral truths? Sure, morality, in the sense of classifications of people, could be used to judge them and their actions, but it is not the only way, unlike what this chap is trying to convince us. A correct conclusion about their actions in the future could come without the use of morality, most easily demonstrated with the Bob and Dave example. It just turns out that morality is a useful tool for doing so. Morality is just a classification of actions and thoughts just as much as any other word or theory is (e.g. MBTI... How much better have you been able to predict and understand people's behaviour after learning this?)

Then, he talks about evil as objective. You could define evil so it can be objectively evaluated. But every action is not always just evil. I steal your money to give to a poor cancer patient? That needs a whole theory about what is more evil and when an action can actually be deemed good or bad.

What to take away from this post? Morality is not inherent or necessary, and good/evil is not as clear-cut as he makes it out to be.

 

[Cherry Cola]

I think you are missreading the article, look at this part:

Because any reasonably accurate theory of mind needs to employ these categories, and because deeds need to be attributed to these categories reasonably accurately, good and evil are true universals, just as “man” or “tiger” are true universals.

It's basically "a fuck you you're wrong" to the people who always resort to grave scepticism when discussing morals and claim it all to be a big puzzle when its not.

It only becomes puzzling when you want to discuss morals as if though they were inherent, not in man, but in the very nature of the universe. As is the case with any human preconceptions.

 

[Coolydudey]

But it doesn't need to (any reasonably accurate theory of the mind doesn't need to employ moral categorisations, it just can be useful to do so). I on the other hand argue that any practical, accurate theory of the mind needs to employ mbti. Thats not true either, although i certainly find mbti more enlightening than morality with regards to human behaviour. That was exactly my point in the first paragraph. Falsify that assumption at the start of the paragraph, and the rest of the paragraph comes crashing down with it, too.

 

[Absurdity]

But it doesn't need to (any reasonably accurate theory of the mind doesn't need to employ moral categorisations, it just can be useful to do so). I on the other hand argue that any practical, accurate theory of the mind needs to employ mbti. Thats not true either, although i certainly find mbti more enlightening than morality with regards to human behaviour. That was exactly my point in the first paragraph. Falsify that assumption at the start of the paragraph, and the rest of the paragraph comes crashing down with it, too.

The theory of mind addressed in the article aims at predicting behavior. MBTI explains cognition but is severely limited with respect to explaining behavior and can only do so in a roundabout way. This conception of morality deals directly with past behavior to predict future behavior. Seems neater to me.

 

[TimeAsylums]

This conception of morality deals directly with past behavior to predict future behavior. Seems neater to me.

That is, IMO, one of the more stupid things I've read...

 

[Brontosaurie]

But it doesn't need to (any reasonably accurate theory of the mind doesn't need to employ moral categorisations, it just can be useful to do so). I on the other hand argue that any practical, accurate theory of the mind needs to employ mbti. Thats not true either, although i certainly find mbti more enlightening than morality with regards to human behaviour. That was exactly my point in the first paragraph. Falsify that assumption at the start of the paragraph, and the rest of the paragraph comes crashing down with it, too.

please describe a theory of mind which circumvents the fundamental categories of desirable and undesirable.

 

[Brontosaurie]

W00000T that smiley is fab2max

 

[kvothe27]

He's just pushing the problem back a step. By what principle does one use to determine which goals one should assume in determining actions, in accordance with theory of mind, that are good and evil? Moreover, sociopaths, just by lacking empathy, will not categorize things in the same way for their goals will obviously differ. So, yes, categorization is arbitrary -- that is, they're contingent on values and adopted goals.

The terms good and evil are not just categories -- they're expressions of value. Sociopaths, in largely being immune to values informed by empathy, will not categorize in the same way. Thus, "good" and "evil" are not universals like "man" and "tiger," for they are often subject to values, pushed out of the way into goals in this article.

He's right that "ought" often isn't used normatively, but so what? The is-ought problem, as far as I know or remember, refers to normative uses of the term, not non-normative uses. Thus, him pointing this out is likely a red herring. The term "ought" is often used in goal-directed statements, and when it comes to goal-oriented statements in regards to morality, certain goals are assumed. So what goals ought we adopt? And how do we derive them from what "is?

 

[Deckard]

This is all explained & resolved from a perspective of ethical subjectivism. Everyone is acting in accordance with his/her personal values, and those actions are both understandable and rational from each agent's perspective.

The quote in the OP says nothing interesting about Hume's is/ought problem, or about good & evil. Oughts and judgements about good/evil depend entirely on the individual's values, and values span the full spectrum. If we wish to understand human behaviour, we must first understand the minds of others, which means engaging with their individual ethical systems.

If you want an ethical framework that both takes into account individual variance AND proscribes action, look at preference utilitarianism. It effectively serves the sum of preferences of every individual, including yourself.

I would say Hume's guillotine stands as strong as ever in demonstrating the naturalistic fallacy and calling awareness to our assumptions about good and evil.

 

[Beat Mango]

They conflate the "who" with the "do".

We judge deeds in order to judge men.

Is it fair to judge a man who spans approximately 70 years, by a deed which spans only an instant? How can this possibly be a logical deduction? There are other assumptions at play.

I often come into this conundrum when trying to figure out what to make of criminals.

 

[Deckard]

They conflate the "who" with the "do".



Is it fair to judge a man who spans approximately 70 years, by a deed which spans only an instant? How can this possibly be a logical deduction? There are other assumptions at play.

I often come into this conundrum when trying to figure out what to make of criminals.

In terms of the judicial system, how can it judge other than by deeds, if subjective bias is to be avoided? I get what you're saying about weighing the sum of a person's actions in order to be fair, but what other practical system is there for penalising harmful behaviour?

 

[The Introvert]

Out of line, but would any of you recommend reading Hume?

 

[BigApplePi]

Something about this baffles me. I hope I don't have to memorize what "normative" means as if there were such a thing.

What about Hume and the is/ought gap?

Hume's argument presupposes that normative concepts are based on “ought”. This does not seem to be how people use such words in practice.

Approximately half the uses of “ought” in everyday speech are clearly non normative (“you ought to bottle the beer when the fermentation starts to slow”), and we have no way of telling a normative use of “ought” from a non normative use of “ought” except by appeal to our already existent intuitive knowledge of what is normative. Thus a definition of “normative” in terms of “ought” is simply false, and thus will lead to false conclusions.

In practice people mostly use normative words not to command, but to justify fearing someone, to justify taking some unpleasant action against someone, or to argue that they themselves should not be feared, to present someone else's conduct as part of a pattern that predicts a likelihood of causing harm, or to present their own conduct as part of a pattern that predicts the opposite.

The argument presented here assumes that normative concepts are not based on “ought” but on “evil”. “Evil” in the sense of “suffering harm” is uncontroversially objective, in the case of the more extreme, obvious, and direct forms of harm, such as the violent death of Bob's creditor. This proof takes us from the uncontroversial objectivity of “suffering evil”, as Bob's creditor and Dave's extortionist suffered, to the controversial objectivity of “doing evil”, as Bob did to his creditor, and Dave did not do to his extortionist. It shows us why some deeds, though far from all deeds, that objectively inflict evil are objectively evil deeds.

Is and ought are different. Is stands still. Ought takes a direction. Let's not confuse how we direct objects from people.

One can look at beer, but in certain cases it is desirable to do something with it and not something else.

Same thing with people. As to "evil" ... it is relative. One person's evil is another's advantage.

 

[r4ch3l]

Suppose we wish to enter into a contract with one of two men, either Bob or Dave. Both Bob and Dave have in the past broken a major promise, though under very different circumstances, both Bob and Dave have killed a man, though under very different circumstances. We need to decide which one is most likely to keep his word and least likely to harm us.

Bob promised to do certain things in return for a large sum of money. He failed to do the things he promised, and he later killed the person who gave him the money in a surprise attack.

Dave promised to do certain things, in return for not having his arms and legs broken. He failed to do the things he promised, and he later killed the person who threatened him in a surprise attack.

Obviously we should contract with Dave, not with Bob. But why is it obvious? How do we know this? How can we know it? How are we capable of knowing it?

To me it looks like power dynamics have a lot to do with this. We should be analyzing the power dynamics to calculate future probability of harm and then ethics will arrange themselves around the statistics in a cellular automata-like fashion. I think that instead of acknowledging the power structure in analyzing and trying to make sense of moral situations (which ALWAYS involve 1) harm + 2) power) people feel empathy and panic. They see that someone has caused someone else pain and assume that this is wrong always and then things like Peter Singer happen. But Peter Singer is delusional and self-righteous though well-intentioned (uh, superficially at least) because he doesn't see or acknowledge the harm he causes accidentally just by existing. It's not so simple because: time.

[I'm slowly trudging through Hegel right now and hope to do a project on object oriented programming and the master-slave dialectic, then connect this structural stuff to ethics.]

----------

Considering starting a new thread on this out-there book People of the Lie by M. Scott Peck that actually has a lot of ideas pertaining to this argument and (I guess) the idea of intent. Too tired to re-skim through the material now but if you want to be less relativistic about things his ideas actually do make sense:

The author states (some are paraphrased) and explains the following:

1. The evil hide their motives with lies.

2. Evil people want to appear to be good.

3. When confronted by evil, the wisest and most secure adult will usually experience confusion.

4. Evil seeks to discourage others to think for themselves (fosters dependency).

5. To oppose evil we must have an ongoing dedication to reality at all cost.

I agree that to be mentally healthy we must believe what is true and only what is true.

To me this says that progress or attempts at re-perfecting things are evil and connects to some religious themes (Buddhist idea of here and now; Christian idea of the tree of knowledge). The crackpot side of my personality loves recreationally pasting these unrelated and unfounded ideas together but FULL DISCLAIMER: am not attached to them personally, just enjoy exploring and connecting.

 

[TimeAsylums]

to be less relativistic about things his ideas actually do make sense:

To me this says that progress or attempts at re-perfecting things are evil and connects to some religious themes (Buddhist idea of here and now; Christian idea of the tree of knowledge). The crackpot side of my personality loves recreationally pasting these unrelated and unfounded ideas together but FULL DISCLAIMER: am not attached to them personally, just enjoy exploring and connecting.

Does it define evil? If so, as what?

(I mean besides the list)

 

[r4ch3l]

Like I said, kinda zonked at the moment and only read half the book awhile back. But the idea captivated me because it looked at "evil" in terms of power and what we can get away with vs. absolute maxims. Wiki:

According to Peck an evil person:[6][7]
Is consistently self-deceiving, with the intent of avoiding guilt and maintaining a self-image of perfection
Deceives others as a consequence of their own self-deception
Projects his or her evils and sins onto very specific targets (scapegoats) while being apparently normal with everyone else ("their insensitivity toward him was selective" (Peck, 1983/1988, p 105[7]))
Commonly hates with the pretense of love, for the purposes of self-deception as much as deception of others
Abuses political (emotional) power ("the imposition of one's will upon others by overt or covert coercion" (Peck, 1978/1992, p298[6]))
Maintains a high level of respectability, and lies incessantly in order to do so
Is consistent in his or her sins. Evil persons are characterized not so much by the magnitude of their sins, but by their consistency (of destructiveness)
Is unable to think from the viewpoint of their victim (scapegoat)
Has a covert intolerance to criticism and other forms of narcissistic injury

So maybe a Gyges ring kind of theme [did a paper on Gyges ring and Wall Street and evolution for a project a long time ago too].

It spins off into some wacky places midway but the points about truly evil people frontin' as good (omg i forgot how to english/ faceplanting on keyboard/sry) to amass more power struck me. Parallels with economics + evolution.

But I doubt under his own definition anyone is completely pure. I like that.
I also like that his idea of evil could be interpreted in a polar way: evil + ___; love + strife [Heraclitus]; 0 + 1;
it's all just the structure of change. not actually evil.
g'night & sorry for terrible sentence structure & general incoherence.
[faceplants]

 

[Deckard]

They see that someone has caused someone else pain and assume that this is wrong always and then things like Peter Singer happen. But Peter Singer is delusional and self-righteous though well-intentioned (uh, superficially at least) because he doesn't see or acknowledge the harm he causes accidentally just by existing.

If you'd actually read any Singer you'd know the latter claim about not acknowledging his own harm is not remotely true, and that the argument that causing someone else pain is always wrong is a complete mischaracterisation of his position on suffering. I mean, just a cursory read of ANY of his works on suffering, including the short essays, would clear those up for you.

Look, I'd be fine if you'd simply misunderstood, but what you've done is put words in his mouth then called him delusional and self-righteous, and I can't imagine how you could be so mistaken after actually reading him. So...yeah. /soapbox

 

[r4ch3l]

If you'd actually read any Singer you'd know the latter claim about not acknowledging his own harm is not remotely true, and that the argument that causing someone else pain is always wrong is a complete mischaracterisation of his position on suffering.

Fair. Fair. Fair. There are always things to revise. I skim material, as I said I don't really care much about ethics. My language is not very precise. I will concede that he acknowledges his own impact on others without actually having bad intent (because utilitarians are actually quite (superficially) rational!). My position that he is ridiculous and self-righteous and does not understand life in a fundamental way stand.

I can't imagine how you could be so mistaken after actually reading him. So...yeah. /soapbox

Yes. I must be mistaken.
/

I have not read his book but did read several essays and broke them down/debated them in class. I'm not going to pursue reading his books when they do not capture my interest and there are so many other books that do.

You are interested in him and know the specifics of his work better than I do because you have chosen to focus on it, you are interested in it or agree with it. I don't. I used him as the utilitarianism poster boy. I understand enough about utilitarianism and its alternatives to confidently say that in my opinion it is a naive philosophy that breeds superiority and an us vs. them mentality (if only everyone behaved as I so rationally do, the world would be better/perfect!).

 

[Deckard]

Thanks for taking my criticism and not getting defensive-- I am somewhat passionate about ethical philosophy get a bit worked up when I feel people have jumped to conclusions. Personally I think Singer is one of the best minds in the field and is unusually good at delineating the complexities of human psychology & values.

I particularly value that he is willing to ruthlessly follow an argument to its rational endpoint without colouring the reasoning by any expectation about where it *should* conclude. A lot of people look at his conclusions and have a general intuition that he must be mistaken, but then have immense trouble demonstrating any flaw with his reasoning.

That's why I'm interested in any well articulated demonstration of flaws or fallacies in his reasoning. If you feel up to fleshing out your position that "he is ridiculous and self-righteous and does not understand life in a fundamental way", I'd be very interested to hear some novel criticisms of Singer, since I've read a lot of him (critically) and have been forced to acknowledge essentially the opposite view the one you expressed.

 

[r4ch3l]

Thanks for taking my criticism and not getting defensive-- I am somewhat passionate about ethical philosophy get a bit worked up when I feel people have jumped to conclusions.

I understand. Have you always been a person concerned with justice or did it come about upon reading more about ethical philosophy? What other philosophers do you agree with?

I particularly value that he is willing to ruthlessly follow an argument to its rational endpoint without colouring the reasoning by any expectation about where it *should* conclude. A lot of people look at his conclusions and have a general intuition that he must be mistaken, but then have immense trouble demonstrating any flaw with his reasoning.

That's why I'm interested in any well articulated demonstration of flaws or fallacies in his reasoning. If you feel up to fleshing out your position that "he is ridiculous and self-righteous and does not understand life in a fundamental way", I'd be very interested to hear some novel criticisms of Singer, since I've read a lot of him (critically) and have been forced to acknowledge essentially the opposite view the one you expressed.

I read the essays four years ago, would need to re-read to feel confident in debating Singer with someone who has read him extensively. I've got a fairly good idea of what I want to say but now I want to take the care to precise. If I wanted to revisit his ideas which of the essays would you recommend? [big picture views of his philosophy; preferably not specific topics like stem cells, veganism, etc.]

 

[Absurdity]

This is all explained & resolved from a perspective of ethical subjectivism. Everyone is acting in accordance with his/her personal values, and those actions are both understandable and rational from each agent's perspective.

The quote in the OP says nothing interesting about Hume's is/ought problem, or about good & evil. Oughts and judgements about good/evil depend entirely on the individual's values, and values span the full spectrum. If we wish to understand human behaviour, we must first understand the minds of others, which means engaging with their individual ethical systems.

Exactly what does this mean when applied to the hypothetical presented in an article? If I thought Bob was just as trustworthy as Dave because I thought wanton murder was equally "valuable" as self-defense I would likely end up dead as the result of an unwise decision to do business with a murderer. I fail to see how this can be a "subjective" assessment.

Within this framework there are right and wrong answers. You can tell when an answer is wrong because the person who fucks up gets killed. Pretty straight forward.

He's just pushing the problem back a step. By what principle does one use to determine which goals one should assume in determining actions, in accordance with theory of mind, that are good and evil? Moreover, sociopaths, just by lacking empathy, will not categorize things in the same way for their goals will obviously differ. So, yes, categorization is arbitrary -- that is, they're contingent on values and adopted goals.

The terms good and evil are not just categories -- they're expressions of value. Sociopaths, in largely being immune to values informed by empathy, will not categorize in the same way. Thus, "good" and "evil" are not universals like "man" and "tiger," for they are often subject to values, pushed out of the way into goals in this article.

There is nothing arbitrary about concluding that a man who violated a contract and killed the person who engaged in it with him is evil. A sociopath would reach the same conclusion or likely end up dead himself after having done business with an evil man.

 

[Deckard]

Exactly what does this mean when applied to the hypothetical presented in an article? If I thought Bob was just as trustworthy as Dave because I thought wanton murder was equally "valuable" as self-defense I would likely end up dead as the result of an unwise decision to do business with a murderer. I fail to see how this can be a "subjective" assessment.

Within this framework there are right and wrong answers. You can tell when an answer is wrong because the person who fucks up gets killed. Pretty straight forward.

The hypothetical is presented as a way to intuitively sell the idea that normative statements are really statements about good/evil (and it utterly fails at that). Where the author concludes:

"Consciously or unconsciously we evaluated the actions of Bob and Dave, and concluded that Bob's actions were gravely evil, and therefore were a sign that he was likely to do similarly evil things in future."

A more objective analysis that avoided projecting personal beliefs about what constitutes good & evil might have been the following:

"Consciously or unconsciously we evaluated the actions of Bob and Dave, and concluded that Bob's actions demonstrated self-interest, and therefore were a sign that he was likely to do similarly self-interested things in future."

There is nothing arbitrary about concluding that a man who violated a contract and killed the person who engaged in it with him is evil. A sociopath would reach the same conclusion or likely end up dead himself after having done business with an evil man.

Subjective ethics != arbitrary ethics. But to engage with what you're saying here, I think the decision of who to enter into a contract with can be made without projecting our personal values onto others or making judgements about good & evil; it's a simple pragmatic case of evaluating the likely consequences in terms of what we personally value (which is a known quantity).

My view is that good and evil are extremely imprecise conceptual buckets that are used to simplify the underlying interactions of values & actions & consequences. It's a useless red-herring that bog down so much of ethics. Why not do away with that unecessary oversimplifying obfuscation and speak directly and precisely about what matters in the scenario? Individual values, consequences and actions.

 

[TimeAsylums]

Subjective ethics != arbitrary ethics. But to engage with what you're saying here, I think the decision of who to enter into a contract with can be made without projecting our personal values onto others or making judgements about good & evil; it's a simple pragmatic case of evaluating the likely consequences in terms of what we personally value (which is a known quantity).

My view is that good and evil are extremely imprecise conceptual buckets that are used to simplify the underlying interactions of values & actions & consequences. It's a useless red-herring that bog down so much of ethics. Why not do away with that unecessary oversimplifying obfuscation and speak directly and precisely about what matters in the scenario? Individual values, consequences and actions.

Spoiler

Yes, a lot of the ethics debates would get a lot farther here if they'd go by this.

 

[Deckard]

I read the essays four years ago, would need to re-read to feel confident in debating Singer with someone who has read him extensively. I've got a fairly good idea of what I want to say but now I want to take the care to precise. If I wanted to revisit his ideas which of the essays would you recommend? [big picture views of his philosophy; preferably not specific topics like stem cells, veganism, etc.]

I would love to give you a nice neat summary of his views on preference utilitarianism, but as far as I can find he hasn't written one outside of his books. Most of his web-published essays are on applied ethics (which are definitely worthwhile discussing, but are light on the foundational arguments & definitions). I'd suggest reading Practical Ethics or Animal Liberation -- from memory both go into significant detail about his take on preference utilitarianism. How he uses those words like "preference" and "interest" is really quite important, and are not necessarily intuitively obvious.

There are not even any good definitions of preference utilitarianism in the first few pages of google results. Out of the wiki article, the SEP article on utilitarianism and the rationalwiki article, wikipedia does the concept the most justice and at least avoids being flat-out wrong (looking at you, rationalwiki), although all of those are extremely brief. Sad state of affairs really. But if there is anything that seems illogical or impractical or obviously wrong with preference utilitarianism, it may just be a misunderstanding, which are extremely common in my experience (understandably).

For the sake of having a discussion though, after brushing up on the wiki definition you could try this on: http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/singer02.htm

 

[Ex-User (5841)]

I want to take a different spin to this: Who would you choose, Bob or Dave?

I would choose Bob. Sure, he killed a guy, but it can be argued that the guy deserved it. He didn't properly assess Bob and thus failed to establish the correct type of relationship with him. What's more is that Bob shows the ability to carry things out, even if they are only to his benefit, while even threats of extreme carnal pain couldn't get Dave to budge. Thus Bob is more likely to benefit me than Dave, provided the relationship is mutual.

I'll make the argument that not only is there no "ought" involved in the choice, but also no "evil."

 

[Deckard]

I want to take a different spin to this: Who would you choose, Bob or Dave?

I would choose Bob. Sure, he killed a guy, but it can be argued that the guy deserved it. He didn't properly assess Bob and thus failed to establish the correct type of relationship with him. What's more is that Bob shows the ability to carry things out, even if they are only to his benefit, while even threats of extreme carnal pain couldn't get Dave to budge. Thus Bob is more likely to benefit me than Dave, provided the relationship is mutual.

Interesting analysis, much better than "we conclude that Bob is obviously evil".

I'll make the argument that not only is there no "ought" involved in the choice, but also no "evil."

The ought is implied since you decided on an action, in the sense of, "if I value successful contract outcomes and not dying, and given my assessment of Bob & Dave's characters, what ought I do?" Your values and your assessment suggested a course of action, which is essentially what "ought" means, both in general usage and in ethics.

 

[r4ch3l]

I would choose Bob. Sure, he killed a guy, but

this is why i love entps.

He didn't properly assess Bob and thus failed to establish the correct type of relationship with him. What's more is that Bob shows the ability to carry things out, even if they are only to his benefit, while even threats of extreme carnal pain couldn't get Dave to budge. Thus Bob is more likely to benefit me than Dave, provided the relationship is mutual.

I'll make the argument that not only is there no "ought" involved in the choice, but also no "evil."

A sociopath would reach the same conclusion or likely end up dead himself after having done business with an evil man.

Hate to go all full circle Wittgenstein (embarassingly copout-ish yet always relevant) but I guess we need to define what the goal of ethics is first, no? Is it promoting the highest degree of harmony within a group? Across humanity? Within the biosphere? For yourself and your own life (self-interest)?

Is it about prioritizing reducing any harm to physical organisms? Or promoting progress at all costs? Is suffering evil or is suffering inevitable?

ethics |ˈeθiks|
plural noun
1 [usu. treated as pl. ] moral principles that govern a person's or group's behavior : Judeo-Christian ethics.
• the moral correctness of specified conduct : the ethics of euthanasia.
2 [usu. treated as sing. ] the branch of knowledge that deals with moral principles.

So the question is: what is the group? Is it all humans? Is equality a principle underlying all ethics? Or are groups formed on common interest?

If groups organically organize based on common goals then TheHabitatDoctor could be onto something. Sociopathic types could work together to achieve more power and enact bigger plans but also desire to be top dog and control others. Maybe the world is nothing more than roving bands of hierarchically-organized sociopath-driven armies (corporations, governments) fighting each other while us plebs squabble about ethics thinking we'll somehow change the natural order of things through reason.

re is nothing arbitrary about concluding that a man who violated a contract and killed the person who engaged in it with him is evil.

Or we could define ethics in a social contract way, then Dave's yer guy.

 

[Ex-User (5841)]

Interesting analysis, much better than "we conclude that Bob is obviously evil".

The ought is implied since you decided on an action, in the sense of, "if I value successful contract outcomes and not dying, and given my assessment of Bob & Dave's characters, what ought I do?" Your values and your assessment suggested a course of action, which is essentially what "ought" means, both in general usage and in ethics.

I don't consider it an ought though; it's an is, a what, a how; objective. The contract itself encompasses successful execution, and without execution it's by default meaningless. An ought implies that executing the contract is better than not, which isn't the case. There's no evidence that the choice is meaningful, and even if it were, meaning would vary by agent and on a grand scale would be a net sum 0. The false assumption is that the decision maker is detached from the net outcome.

In this sense the only thing morally questionable is the act of making choices itself. (And even ^that statement is nebulous due to that M word...)

this is why i love entps.

I'm not just trolling, I really would choose Bob.

 

[Cherry Cola]

If you view this from a biological perspective then it's pretty clear that what the OPs article describes is a mode of orientation which humans need in their interactions with others, and this orientation is done by means of moral categorization which is probably the origin of our inner sense of good and evil, in a sense what good and evil is, even if but from a human perspective, and not in an absolute sense. Categorization requires universals, they are power outlet for the plug if the plug is an external agent to be categorized, if we intuitively use these categories to predict the behavior of other people then the universals must be there to support the categories, because without them we'd be talking sense impressions which doesn't hold up.

Feels like a lot of the critique here stems from people taking the article to be a "cure to nihilism" or something.

 

[Ex-User (5841)]

Is it promoting the highest degree of harmony within a group? Across humanity? Within the biosphere? For yourself and your own life (self-interest)?

Is it about prioritizing reducing any harm to physical organisms? Or promoting progress at all costs? Is suffering evil or is suffering inevitable?

So the question is: what is the group? Is it all humans? Is equality a principle underlying all ethics? Or are groups formed on common interest?

I... don't see any of these goals not being addressed by deterministic forces.
All ethics are entirely subjective, amirite?

If groups organically organize based on common goals then TheHabitatDoctor could be onto something. Sociopathic types could work together to achieve more power and enact bigger plans but also desire to be top dog and control others. Maybe the world is nothing more than roving bands of hierarchically-organized sociopath-driven armies (corporations, governments) fighting each other while us plebs squabble about ethics thinking we'll somehow change the natural order of things through reason.

The key to structural stability ^here is the proportion of sociopathic types within society and their intrinsic limiting factors.


And fuck Dave. His sandwiches sucked anyway.

Spoiler

 

[Deckard]

I understand. Have you always been a person concerned with justice or did it come about upon reading more about ethical philosophy? What other philosophers do you agree with?

Oh -- missed this question. Not so much concerned with justice (that having connotations of serving specific sets of rules), but always concerned with what is "right", and working out what that is. I think growing up with a Christian pastor as a father instilled a sense of moral duty, which has forced me to closely examine my actions and the spectrum of possible actions in a way that many do not. This doesn't make me intrinsically more moral (since morality is relative); it just means I have more difficulty evading my conscience, or suppressing my better judgement, or engaging in cognitive dissonance. Which is good, I think, even if I have rejected the religious system that instilled it.

 

[Ex-User (5841)]

I didn't actually buzzkill this thing, did I?

Spoiler

 

[ZenRaiden]

But Man can change. The problem is that we can change if we want to. So past experience is not really going to help us. We can assume all kinds of things about other people, the trick is to see what really counts. As for what counts we need to see two things. First is why the motive and second why the action. You see all people are alike and that is the reason we can actually create the imaginary understanding of other people. Human mind however has the capacity to turn its priorities under new circumstances. Lets say that someone is indeed untrustworthy. What will happen if the person knows we consdier it untrustworthy? Will it act the same as if we pretend that we do not believe it is untrustworthy?

There are two main securities in contract, one is the reasonable contract and the second is honoring tradition.

If you have a choice you will always find contract with those who have reason or tradition and avoid those who fail to comply to reason and tradition.

 

[kvothe27]

There is nothing arbitrary about concluding that a man who violated a contract and killed the person who engaged in it with him is evil. A sociopath would reach the same conclusion or likely end up dead himself after having done business with an evil man.

From Merriam-Webster:

Definition of ARBITRARY

1
:depending on individual discretion (as of a judge) and not fixed by law

The sociopath may want the man to attempt to kill him as part of some game, or, to use a different example, someone suicidal would want the man to kill him.

This goes back to what I was saying earlier in that whether it is good or evil is dependent upon a person's goals. A person's goals are an expression of a person's values. So what goals ought we adopt and how do we derive them from what is? We do so via individual discretion. In the case of the suicidal person or the sociopath, given that their goals differ, that man would not be categorized as evil, unless these people are terribly confused Christians or some such thing.

 

[Absurdity]

From Merriam-Webster:

Cute. Pretty sure it was clear that by arbitrary I meant, "Based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system."

The sociopath may want the man to attempt to kill him as part of some game, or, to use a different example, someone suicidal would want the man to kill him.

This goes back to what I was saying earlier in that whether it is good or evil is dependent upon a person's goals. A person's goals are an expression of a person's values. So what goals ought we adopt and how do we derive them from what is? We do so via individual discretion. In the case of the suicidal person or the sociopath, given that their goals differ, that man would not be categorized as evil, unless these people are terribly confused Christians or some such thing.

Right. The fact that such clearly defective individuals as sociopaths and the suicidally inclined are needed to attempt to "refute" the OP really only further proves its point.

 

[Jennywocky]

I didn't actually buzzkill this thing, did I?

Spoiler

Murderer.

The only question now is what your motivations might have been.

Cute. Pretty sure it was clear that by arbitrary I meant, "Based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system."

Well, if it matters, that's how I read it (vs the "arbitrator" style def).

I'm not just trolling, I really would choose Bob.

That's good. Sometimes I think people just pick the unexpected answer (and then justify it) for shock value.

Not that I'd ever do that.

Not sure what the point in picking Bob would be, though; I mean, you presented reasons, but they seemed more like "argument" reasons than "real life" reasons. I mean, people will argue anything, but will they make the same choices when their lives are actually, realistically on the line and it's no longer a theoretical?

As presented, the Bob scenario is, "Bob agrees to undertake a responsibility, fails to carry through, and then jumps the guy he had made a promise to," and the Dave scenario is, "Dave is coerced to perform a task, fails to perform it, and then jumps the guy who theatened him." That seems to be the conceptual summary of the two scenarios.

Aside from both having a lack of self-confidence [as they both resort to "blitz style" killings because they don't feel they can control their situation with a more direct approach and a fair fight -- ha!], we don't even have to look at good and evil [which have rightfully been decried as gross buckets meant to simplify decision making at cost of nuance], or motivations. Just look at behavior.

Dave kills people who threaten him first; Bob kills people who Bob has broken promises to. From which one can I more minimize harm to myself? It's not complicated, as one of those scenarios I can control and one I cannot. It's like saying, "Which dog will I trust more? The one who bites people at any provocation after pretending to be friendly, to get close; or the one who bit me after I beat it with a baseball bat for awhile?"

 

[kvothe27]

They're counterexamples to the point, which, yeah, refutes it. Good and evil are not universal categorizations. They're expressions of value that vary individual-to-individual.

 

[Cherry Cola]

Or maybe they are both and the article is about good and evil in the former sense which we all have in common, not the latter which is ladled with all kinds of issues and is thus more of a perpetuated philosophical question; indeed trying to prove the mere existence of good and evil becomes very hard if that's all you go by. The article does away with that issue by showing that while on the level of personal moral philosophy the dichotomy is vague and unprovable, it still exists as a collective mental framework in our species. In that sense good and evil are very real and needn't be subjected to brutal scepticism whenever moral discussions are to be held, because there is solid and common ground for the dichotomy putting it at the same level of reality as any other universal (and we don't subject the concept of "chair" to brutal scrutiny when discussing different set-ups of household furniture).

 

[kvothe27]

The capacity for categorizing good and evil is certainly universal, but the categories themselves are not. It will be subject to skepticism when some individual, employing his own individual discretion on the matter and his resulting personal categorization, attempts to force his categorization on me as though our goals are the same or ought to be the same given what he perceives as being what "is."

The capacity for categorizing a chair in some mental framework is universal, but the category is still not universal. Someone from a different culture may categorize it differently. Just because we were raised to view a chair as having a certain function, does not mean it necessarily ought to have that function. Some alien may view chairs as possessing some other function, for example.

While this may allow moral discussion among like-minded individuals, we already knew that. Hence, why Christians are more likely to have moral discussions with other Christians -- at least, in cases where they want the discussion to get off the ground (meaning, not talking to an atheist or whatever).

This does not bridge Hume's guillotine. It merely bypasses it, which just about everyone does anyway by surrounding themselves with like-minded individuals and by engaging in tribal mentalities.

 

[Cherry Cola]

A category is a universal, that does not make the category universal however.

You're now using Aliens to prove your point, Absurdity's retort rings true again. And you've proved exactly what my point was. You have to bring it to the level of "Do we truly know what a chair is?" to deny what is being said in the article. That level of scepticism will tear down anything in its path, it's just strange that it's course is oh so often set on the concepts of good and evil whenever they are to be used in discourse.

It's a disease of the postmodern western world sure, but it's strange how long it has lingered nonetheless.

This has nothing to do with subjective ideologies such as Christianity, were talking a biologically anchored framework, not its culturally twisted offspring, there's a clear distinction between the two. If Christianity is a stock character then what the article is about is the archetype of the character.

 

[kvothe27]

If you want to replace aliens with something else, feel free. Whether it's aliens or some isolated tribe is beside the point. If you dislike that level of skepticism, then I would suggest just avoiding the is-ought problem altogether because that's the level of skepticism it is at. The is-ought problem is up there with the problem of induction. Much like the problem of induction can be used to discount scientific inquiry, so can moral skepticism be used to discount numerous moral frameworks. This skepticism of skepticism still doesn't bridge the is-ought gap.

I have no problem with bypassing that level of skepticism if someone states the assumptions at the beginning of the discussion or we're in a context where it is understood that certain assumptions are taken for granted. In this way, the "disease" of the post modern western world can be avoided. Given the controversy surround morality, it is not strange that moral skepticism is brought up more often than other forms of skepticism.

Again, just replace Christianity with something else. All I'm pointing out is that people who want to discuss things with people who think similarly do so already. People who don't will categorize differently.

Okay. What is a biologically anchored framework if not a capacity for making categories? I already made a distinction between a capacity for categorization and the categories themselves, if this is what you mean. Does the biological framework itself already consist of categories?

 

[Cherry Cola]

Yes, I mean to say that good and evil are hard coded categories, like the Jungian Archetypes that can be used to describe characters of fiction transculturally, their expressions wary with the cultural context but they are all the offspring of some archaic formula.

Hencewhy, I think the analogy would fail if you replaced the aliens with humans.

I don't think the is/ought problem is solved in the article, it is only disposed of in the given context, not as an all encompassing philosophical problem akin to "who moved the original mover?" in that it's basically one form of the ultimate question. I should probably have clarified that before : /

 

[kvothe27]

That's an interesting idea.

It would seem that you think there is some ideal based on your statement that Christianity is the archaic formula's "culturally twisted offspring," if I'm understanding you correctly. Do you think that if this archaic formula were instantiated ideally with ideal values for its variables that an ideal moral framework would follow?

Plato's allegory of the cave comes to mind

 

[Cherry Cola]

Yeah Plato's cave allegory is essentially an attempt to deal with problem of universals and an admittance of Archetypes, I think Jung said something about him essentially copying Plato as well.

Concerning the question I'm not sure that's possible or that an ideal form even exists, hence the word "framework", something has to go into the framework in order for it to be expressable. Any attempts to express pure forms seem to fall short in front of the unabridgable gap between the subject and the object or the is/ought problem if you will, I see them as essentially the same.