scorpiomover
The little professor
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I can't say I've ever heard or read of great thinkers like Newton, Boyle, Maxwell, Avicenna, Averroes, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas of Acquinas, ever using terms like "noetic knowledge", "prudential knowledge", and "sapiential knowledge".I would like to know what these people think is worth knowing if not principles (the object of noetic knowledge) and their applications (the object of rational knowledge), both of which pertain to wisdom as I've described it. Even prudential (i.e. useful) knowledge is included in sapiential knowledge, though wisdom is by no means exhausted by prudence.
I've only ever heard philosophy majors using terms like these, and they talk about "philosophy" as if it means knowledge, and not "love of wisdom", as you claim.
We understand each other in English, because there is a common meaning to the words, or else we would not be able to understand what each other mean. So there is a general understanding in English.The word 'wisdom' no more has a single, unanimously recognized meaning than 'intelligence' does, for the simple reason that English is not an artificially univocal, 'one word, one meaning' language like a mathematical deductive system, and is moreover quite unsuited to discussing immaterial things like the different kinds of knowledge.
I've learned a heck of a lot of exegesis and Kabbalah. They do not define "Chochmah" anywhere, but clearly always use the word "wisdom" as meaning "useful knowledge".The Hebrew word 'Chochmah', likewise, has very different meanings in exegetical and Kabbalistic contexts from the one you described here.
They also talk about "Binah" as the ability to use one concept to derive others, and "Daat" as practical experience. The word "knowledge", however, is something they never mention.
You have relied upon "philosophos" as "phlio" + "sophos", where "philo" means "love of", to re-interpret the meaning of the word "philosophy". However, that doesn't fit the way people who engage in philosophy as you extensively have, use the word "philosophy".Convention is not always the best guide when one wishes to express oneself precisely. One must also rely on etymology, as I have.
Moreover, you have not described the etymology of "sophos". So all you have is that philosophy = "love of sophos".
If you want to get into the etymology of it, then fine:
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philosophy | Search Online Etymology Dictionary
The online etymology dictionary (etymonline) is the internet's go-to source for quick and reliable accounts of the origin and history of English words, phrases, and idioms. It is professional enough to satisfy academic standards, but accessible enough to be used by anyone.
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c. 1300, philosophie, "knowledge, learning, scholarship, scholarly works, body of knowledge," from Old French filosofie "philosophy, knowledge" (12c., Modern French philosophie) and directly from Latin philosophia, from Greek philosophia "love of knowledge, pursuit of wisdom; systematic investigation," from philo- "loving" (see philo-) + sophia "knowledge, wisdom," from sophis "wise, learned;" a word of unknown origin [Beekes]. With many spelling variants in Middle English (filozofie, phelosophie, etc.).
From mid-14c. as "the discipline of dealing in rational speculation or contemplation;" from late 14c. as "natural science," also "alchemy, occult knowledge;" in the Middle Ages the word was understood to embrace all speculative sciences. The meaning "system a person forms for conduct of life" is attested from 1771. The modern sense of "the body of highest truth, the science of the most fundamental matters" is from 1794.
From mid-14c. as "the discipline of dealing in rational speculation or contemplation;" from late 14c. as "natural science," also "alchemy, occult knowledge;" in the Middle Ages the word was understood to embrace all speculative sciences. The meaning "system a person forms for conduct of life" is attested from 1771. The modern sense of "the body of highest truth, the science of the most fundamental matters" is from 1794.
Nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae; sapientia autem est rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque quibus eae res continentur scientia. [Cicero, "De Officiis"]
In 1744 he made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a professorship at Edinburgh; having failed in this, he became first a tutor to a lunatic and then secretary to a general. Fortified by these credentials, he ventured again into philosophy. [Bertrand Russell, writing of Hume, in "A History of Western Philosophy," 1945]
[Philosophical problems] are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized — despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not through the contribution of new knowledge, rather through the arrangement of things long familiar. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment (Verhexung) of our understanding by the resources of our language. [Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Investigations," 1953]
So the statement 'From mid-14c. as "the discipline of dealing in rational speculation or contemplation;" ', I think covers it.
However, that doesn't mean "love of" and that doesn't mean "wisdom".
I believe that Kant wrote that statements can be both analytic AND a priori, did he not?I've already offered a proof of Kant's genius. Evidently, it didn't satisfy you, though I'm not sure if you've understood it, since you seem to think that it's based on his analytic-synthetic distinction whereas I pointed to his distinction between analyticity and apriority. This was, in any case, a digression from my main point, which was that the 'obviousness' of a statement depends on its analyticity, which in turn depends on its context.
Moreover, I believe that "all bachelors are unmarried" would count as both an analytic statement AND an "a priori" statement, as you don't need to know any bachelors to know if all bachelors are unmarried.
So I don't see how there can be a "distinction between analycity and apriority".
Moreover, it's quite evident that everyone knew of such concepts long before Kant was even born:
1) An analytic statement is a tautology. Tautologies were known about since the 1500s. Kant was born in 1724.
2) A priori claims were known about since the early days of mathematics.
Pretty much everything in maths matches empirical data, and yet empirical proofs of mathematial theorems were never accepted. Even now, the Goldbach's conjecture clearly has more than enough empirical support, that were it a scientific theory, it would have been accepted long before now. But it's still considered unproved, because it has not been proved in an a priori way.
Conversely, the majority of science is proved using a posteriori means. An a priori proof of a scientific theory is normally rejected until a posteriori evidence can be found to back it up.
So quite clearly, mathematics only relies upon a priori proofs and not a posteriori proofs, while science seems to the reverse.
That was the case long before Kant was born. So quite clearly, the distinction was known about and made, long before Kant was born.
So I fail to see where Kant was suggesting anything that wasn't known about long before he was born.
I will go onto another point of Kant: his Categorical Imperative has been lampooned many times due to the case of "the murderer at the door".
So you don't seem to be making valid points that prove that Kant was a genius.
I happen to think that Kant was a very smart man. But I cannot deny these points, and therefore, I cannot consider him as being very smart, on the basis of the arguments that you have presented here, which is precisely why I have veered from modern conventional viewpoints of Kant's own ideas, and in so doing, veered away from modern conventional ideas of philosophy.
I would, however, agree, that the consequences of modern conventional views of philosophy are very reminisicent of the issues that were described in the Middle Ages of those who engaged in Aristotelian philosophy, and led to Aristotelian philosophy being considered dangerous for young men to study, which in turn led to the works of Maimonides being burned for having referenced Aristotelian philosophy in his works.
So I agree that the attitude that you took towards philosophy, that so many young men have taken, even hundreds of years before you were born, is very dangerous.