Your post contains more than one point, and furthermore, your initial argument about the psychological motivations of reductionists displayed their philosophy in a dismissve tone. Therefore, you either had a slip of the tongue and allowed your personal contempt for reductionism to seep into your descriptions of it, or you actually intended to dismiss it.
This might be true-- but that still wouldn't mean I was
distracting from the point, would it? I was making the post I was making, which may or may not have indicated my disagreement with the tenability of reductionism as a position. If this was of interest, a further discussion about this could be initiated,
from which 'ad hominems'
would be a distraction and in the context of which they would constitute a fallacy. Given that no such discussion was in motion until you initiated it, your dismissal of the psychological aspects of my post is still very off-base.
Those aspects, as I'll show in a couple of paragraphs,
were the point of my post. If I was taking some premise as granted, there's no reason somebody couldn't (as you did) challenge and discuss that premise. That's all fine, and par for the course-- and nothing to do with 'distracting'
ad hominems, which you accused me of.
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Does not necessarily. Right. But the same conclusion holds in the opposite direction. And suggests a weakness in your a priori assertion than the universe is deterministic, given that we have strong reason to believe that some of the scales at which we understand it with most precision aren't."
Another strawman: I assumed a-priori that the universe is determinitic at large scales, and the observations of biologists, chemists, and even physicists-- apart from those working at scales too small to be relevant to the practical applications of studying brain function-- support this conclusion.
Oh, they do? And your Nobel Prize for establishing this is shortly to be announced?
Please see my analysis of your 'some x are a, and all x are b, therefore all b are a' logical fallacy earlier in this thread.
We can't know everything, so we reason based on statistically valid samples-- a foundation of the stochastic probability theory that you used as a counterexample. In fact, almost all of statistial theory involves sampling. Your reasoning appears to be inconsistent.
This-- along with your other appeal to the necessity of induction-- is totally misleading.
Induction might apply reasonably within a class: we can know that all humans probably have hearts, from the data we have. Or we can know certain properties about how all atoms move, or about how gravity works. Extending this to making a claim about the nature of the universe as an encompassing whole based upon our limited understanding of certain and limited processes, which understanding itself suggests
non-determinism as a vital element of them, is far more tenuous.
If we were to satisfactorily model a few animals, or ecosystems, or total planetary environments, via deterministic modelling, then the induction that the universe was characterised by the properties sufficient to totally model these contexts might be valid. The models we currently have now don't, though, justify the refrain that 'we can't know everything about every event so we just have to infer'-- unless you'd like to demonstrate otherwise. We're still very much at the stage of just not knowing.
My earlier psychological point (and, to make clear, this isn't in itself an argument against universal determinism) regarded the role that the blind-faith assertion of total determinism, and the total elimination of subjectivity and unpredictability (ala Auburn and Cognisant), played in our psyche
given this inability to really
know at the present state in our knowledge. The surety is out of all proportion to the evidence and the philosophical difficulty of the problem. Why don't people, then, just let the research programs run on the axioms/tracks they're productively running on, and personally withhold judgement or take a more conservative position? My point was to do with that.
I fully support the continuance of scientific research programs based upon the assumption of determinism, if that is a useful assumption. And I don't necessarily reject the possibility of a deterministic universe (although we already seem to have reason to believe it wouldn't be
really an fully deterministic, in the way classically envisaged). My interest here was in why a certain, not that strong, position plays such a dominant role in cultural discourse and individual psychology.
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Let's say I agreed with you (despite your not defining 'laws of nature' or your evidence and reasons for believing in them). Determinism and the reduction/domination/neutralisation of all subjectivity to an objective mathematics of determinism in no way follows. Laws of Nature could certainly be conceived of, as a thought experiment, to accommodate either scenario."
Can you clarify and expand on this point? The laws of nature, once known, would by definition allow us to objectively model every event in the universe.
Objectively model, perhaps, but why would this necessarily extend to the elimination of unpredictability or the deterministic modelling of every future state from a given known state? What is your justification for a priori asserting that Laws of Nature (however you're defining these, again) couldn't explicitly involve the interaction of unpredictable and predictable elements in a totally modeled, but not totally predictable, manner?
What is your justification for a priori asserting that Nature isn't capable of encoding either partial and specifically placed or less partial and more generally operant unpredictability, or even agency, as a law? A universe of this kind-- whether ours is like that or not-- certainly isn't beyond the limits of human imagination, and wouldn't necessarily be totally chaotic.
An example universe: one in which the physical world is entirely causal
and deterministic except in so far as non-deterministic elements interact with and change the course of its causally deterministic processes, and in which life is a physically located and physically limited/constrained nexus between that deterministic causality and something else. I'm not saying this is the universe we live in-- just that its one that could be modeled partially or wholly by laws of nature. I could give more examples, many incompatible with this causal/acausal model. One would be the same interaction but with stochastic processes or only partially or partially modellable deterministic elements, which would more closely match our current models of macro phenomena. The point is that there are a number of ways this could work.
Note that the very concept of 'Laws of Nature' was actually originated by very Christian scientists, who saw them as 'Laws' by which some extra-physical entity-- a God-- set the universe in motion. These scientists all believed in free will and the interaction of physicality and something else. I'm not Christian, and I don't necessarily believe in that. I'm just pointing out that things aren't as clear cut with the 'Laws of Nature' notion as you're implying.
... Apart from that, what non-supernatural model of non-deterministic mental activity exists?. Furthermore, why are you attempting to spread your private convictions (which are what any "subjective model" ultimately amounts to) to others? The standard of proof for arguments made to other agents is objective demonstration.
Why would I need to provide such a model? I don't think we have either non-deterministic or deterministic 'models', as in actual scientific theories, of mental activity. Only preliminary postulations.
As for postulations, there are many. And many would accommodate either stochastic, agential, non-deterministic, deterministic or non-committed ways of thinking about causation. This seems like a Red Herring.
What private convictions? What are you talking about?