Free Will

[birdsnestfern]

 

[Daddy]

The thing is, what he's basically saying is that having boundaries that define who you are means being preordained, where having a subconscious means you're choices are never 100% consciously made because you end up with the parameters for your existence laid out for you and the predictable result that follows. (This is my interpretation of course)

However, the problem with that is if we have no boundaries, no subconscious, we have no form from which to exist or motivation from which to perceive, think, feel, and decide. Having form, a subconscious, parts of ourselves that follow physical laws or are made from a certain genetic design is necessary to be what we are. It's a form of differentiation that brings us into existence. Inductively, what he's then actually saying is that by existing we have no free will. Yet if we didn't exist, we wouldn't even be able to entertain the idea of a free will and that truly is having no free will.

Thus, like most (or probably all) things, the greater truth, is the degree of relative free will that we have. We are never completely free or we wouldn't exist (and paradoxically would have zero free will anyway), but there are degrees of freedom that can we appreciate. So I don't see the point in trying to make such a dramatic conclusion that free will doesn't exist. It does, it's just relative. But perhaps he hasn't considered this.

 

[Rook]

i'm free to skip the video walter white and I did. i am the one who twerks.

 

[Old Things]

Uhg. I kinda have to sneer at this video.

Everyone except for hard determinists believes humans have free will in some capacity. So it need not be defined as "the ability to do otherwise" which quite frankly is absurd because it ends with possible worlds where you would have done otherwise even if everything was the same down to your mood. The question, for Compatibilists at least, isn't whether we can do otherwise, but rather that, nothing prevented what you did. You have Free Will insofar as you are acting in accord with your nature and nothing prevents you from doing what you do. I apologize, but this video really is only covering a very small portion of the debate and for that, I don't really have much respect for the view given in it.

 

[Cognisant]

Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.

The question, for Compatibilists at least, isn't whether we can do otherwise, but rather that, nothing prevented what you did. You have Free Will insofar as you are acting in accord with your nature and nothing prevents you from doing what you do.

So if god is all knowing and all powerful, he's an asshole, because he created flawed people doomed to sin and then punishes them for being how he made them.

Honestly the "god is an asshole" theory explains so much.

Alternatively god isn't all powerful or all knowing, but then is that really a god or just a powerful entity?

 

[Old Things]

So if god is all knowing and all powerful, he's an asshole, because he created flawed people doomed to sin and then punishes them for being how he made them.

Honestly the "god is an asshole" theory explains so much.

Alternatively god isn't all powerful or all knowing, but then is that really a god or just a powerful entity?

Free Will need not be a dichotomy. I know I have real choices to make that are not controlled directly by God. I still have the Freedom to act the way I want to act and as such, I am not forced to act any such way. But this need not mean that I am always choosing between one thing and another. My mind is Free because nothing hinders me yet I don't really, in actuality, could do something else. My theory, which is unique in some sense, is that I am the train that is on the tracks and I choose which tracks to be directed on, but nonetheless, I am still constrained to the tracks themselves. So I do not believe God needs to force me to do any evil, I do that of my own Free Will.

 

[Cognisant]

Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.

 

[Old Things]

Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.

The Compatibilists would disagree.

 

[Puffy]

Choices within constraints summarises my take I think.

We’re not free to do whatever we want. There’s a trajectory or pattern to a life, even to our characters and early defining experiences which constrains our choices. I’m unsure we can change the trajectory in a big way just make adjustments and steer it a bit.

When I reflect on it most of the big moments in my life were outside my control. But it’s hard to say to what extent my micro-choices led to or enabled them to happen.

e.g at university I was placed in a dorm filled with active Christians. So it was basically setup I’d convert for at least a while which catalysed big stuff for me. But I also enjoyed other subjects and could’ve chosen to study a different topic at a different university. Maybe then this conversion experience wouldn’t have happened.

So it boils down to, did I have the choice to study other topics somewhere else? I think so.

Another way of seeing it is that we all have our wounds and weaknesses that shape us as a result of experiences we couldn’t control. So regardless of what we choose or how we choose to deal with it they’re things we’ll have to come to terms with. So the lessons we need to learn in life are setup for us but how we choose to learn them (or not) is a matter of our choice.

 

[Cognisant]

Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.

The Compatibilists would disagree.

How?
With causality event are deterministic.
Without causality the outcome of an action cannot be determined.
There's no such thing as semi-causality.

Introducing some kind of psychic time travel doesn't change anything because in order for actions to have any moral relevance the outcome of those actions have to be sufficiently determinable, and they only way they can be determinable at all is if you're operating within some kind of causality, and if there's causality then those determinable events are therefore deterministic.

If Compatibilists disagree it's because they're Sophists.

 

[Hadoblado]

I think it helps to think in degrees of freedom.

At zero degrees of freedom, there is one option available and therefore zero choices. At one degree of freedom, you have two options available and therefore one choice.

But converting this to the real world, stuff we would categorise as non-freedom, such as slavery, contains non-zero degrees of freedom. You can slow your breathing, blink, whatever.

A determinist believes that you are at absolute zero on freedom, so in some respects, less freedom than is typically attributed to a slave. I believe they are correct down to at least the quantum level beyond which I understand nothing.

However, I also agree that it is possible to be free to act within your nature, and that this is meaningful.

So maybe freedom isn't a monolith? Maybe it's meaningful to think of freedom at different levels. I don't really understand why people are sneering.

 

[Cognisant]

1. Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
2. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
3. Is he both able and willing? Then from whence comes evil? Free will.
4. Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.
5. If free will is not possible then either God is malevolent or impotent.

The concept of free will exists solely as a reaction to The Problem of Evil, it has no relevance to any other topic.

 

[Hadoblado]

Do you delineate free will from freedom? If not, is the concept of slavery meaningful?

 

[Old Things]

Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.

The Compatibilists would disagree.

How?
With causality event are deterministic.
Without causality the outcome of an action cannot be determined.
There's no such thing as semi-causality.

Introducing some kind of psychic time travel doesn't change anything because in order for actions to have any moral relevance the outcome of those actions have to be sufficiently determinable, and they only way they can be determinable at all is if you're operating within some kind of causality, and if there's causality then those determinable events are therefore deterministic.

If Compatibilists disagree it's because they're Sophists.

You are pretty much doing the exact same thing Cosmic Skeptic is doing by only accounting for incompatible definitions. As I already explained, Compatibilists believe the way we have free will is that nothing prevents them from doing something. It was alluded to in the video, but never really addressed. The difference is in choosing to jump vs being pushed. In hard determinism, no matter what you do, you are always pushed. Therefore, it makes your wants things you HAVE to do.

 

[Cognisant]

Do you delineate free will from freedom? If not, is the concept of slavery meaningful?

Of course they're different, hence why we have the phrase "free will" and the word "freedom", if I'm tied up and gagged that's not an imposition upon my free will but rather an imposition upon my ability to enact my will.

An imposition upon my free will would be if I was tricked into doing something, if I go into an elevator and unbeknownst to me the elevator button triggers a bomb that kills someone then I have not killed them of my own free will, I've been tricked, and as such I'm not the one accountable for that person's death.

To be accountable for the outcome of your actions you need to have performed those actions of your own free will.

You are pretty much doing the exact same thing Cosmic Skeptic is doing by only accounting for incompatible definitions. As I already explained, Compatibilists believe the way we have free will is that nothing prevents them from doing something. It was alluded to in the video, but never really addressed. The difference is in choosing to jump vs being pushed. In hard determinism, no matter what you do, you are always pushed. Therefore, it makes your wants things you HAVE to do.

I haven't been able to load the video.

Determinism isn't being forced to do something it's the fact that whatever choice you make, for whatever reason you make it, was the choice you were always going to make, that due to causality the future is as immutable as the past.

To a materialist such as myself this is both blindingly obvious and utterly irrelevant, of course if you repeat the exact same scenario with the exact same parameters you're going to get the exact same outcome, why wouldn't you? But we can't go back in time nor see the future so it doesn't matter if reality is causal and deterministic, it only matters if you believe there's an omnipotent god that will punish you for immoral behavior.

Because that doesn't make sense, why would an all-knowing all-powerful god that created us with absolute knowledge of what it was doing and what it was creating and what that creation would do then punish that creation for doing exactly what it was created to do?

It's like an insane clock maker smashing his clocks for telling the time when that's exactly what he created them to do, except crueler because those clocks are thinking feeling people who never asked to be born.

 

[Old Things]

I haven't been able to load the video.

Determinism isn't being forced to do something it's the fact that whatever choice you make, for whatever reason you make it, was the choice you were always going to make, that due to causality the future is as immutable as the past.

To a materialist such as myself this is both blindingly obvious and utterly irrelevant, of course if you repeat the exact same scenario with the exact same parameters you're going to get the exact same outcome, why wouldn't you? But we can't go back in time nor see the future so it doesn't matter if reality is causal and deterministic, it only matters if you believe there's an omnipotent god that will punish you for immoral behavior.

Because that doesn't make sense, why would an all-knowing all-powerful god that created us with absolute knowledge of what it was doing and what it was creating and what that creation would do then punish that creation for doing exactly what it was created to do?

It's like an insane clock maker smashing his clocks for telling the time when that's exactly what he created them to do, except crueler because those clocks are thinking feeling people who never asked to be born.

You've completely misunderstood my position. I just made a thread somewhat about this, as perhaps a part of God's providence where I believe I answer your inquiry here. It is not that God is just waiting to smash you. It's that I'm forgiven which leads me to love my neighbor.

See more in this thread:

Jordan Peterson's Misappropriation of Self Improvement

"Incremental improvement scales exponentially." "It's the oscillating self-corrective process that leads you to the final star" "You don't experience happiness except in relationship to a goal" "We have to consciously decide that we're going to do everything we can as individuals to walk in...

www.intpforum.com

 

[Cognisant]

I understand that your position is illogical and you're willfully ignorant of what determinism is.

It is not that God is just waiting to smash you. It's that I'm forgiven which leads me to love my neighbor.

Do you know what a non sequitur is?

The fact is you don't have an answer to this:

1. Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
2. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
3. Is he both able and willing? Then from whence comes evil? Free will.
4. Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.
5. If free will is not possible then either God is malevolent or impotent.

At least not a rational one, but apparently that won't stop you from incoherently babbling at me anyway.

 

[Hadoblado]

Old things, Cog acknowledges a difference between free will and freedom.

You also have made this distinction between deterministic free will ("the ability to do otherwise") and freedom (free to act in accordance with your nature).

If you both recognise the distinction, what do you think is the factor determining your difference in conclusion?

 

[Old Things]

I understand that your position is illogical and you're willfully ignorant of what determinism is.

You are acting like I'm the only Compatibilist in the world. In schools of philosophy, I actually think a majority of them are Compatibilists.

It is not that God is just waiting to smash you. It's that I'm forgiven which leads me to love my neighbor.

Do you know what a non sequitur is?

The fact is you don't have an answer to this:

1. Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
2. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
3. Is he both able and willing? Then from whence comes evil? Free will.
4. Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.
5. If free will is not possible then either God is malevolent or impotent.

At least not a rational one, but apparently that won't stop you from incoherently babbling at me anyway.

Friend, it is not all up to God in what we do. It is also up to us.

Romans 2:6–11 ESV
“He will render to each one according to his works: to those who by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life; but for those who are self-seeking and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, there will be wrath and fury. There will be tribulation and distress for every human being who does evil, the Jew first and also the Greek, but glory and honor and peace for everyone who does good, the Jew first and also the Greek. For God shows no partiality.”

 

[Old Things]

Old things, Cog acknowledges a difference between free will and freedom.

You also have made this distinction between deterministic free will ("the ability to do otherwise") and freedom (free to act in accordance with your nature).

If you both recognise the distinction, what do you think is the factor determining your difference in conclusion?

The ability to act within your nature and not being forced is the definition of Free Will many people use.

 

[Hadoblado]

Okay so the whole issue is that you're using different words?

Why would you sneer over just using different words? That's dumb.

 

[Old Things]

Okay so the whole issue is that you're using different words?

Why would you sneer over just using different words? That's dumb.

As I said,

I apologize, but this video really is only covering a very small portion of the debate and for that, I don't really have much respect for the view given in it.

If you want to know more about Compatibilism, here's a good start:

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Cognisant]

You also have made this distinction between deterministic free will ("the ability to do otherwise") and freedom (free to act in accordance with your nature).

That's nonsensical.

Freedom is a matter of ability.
Free will is a matter of accountability.

I'm quite sure Old Things and I can at least agree on that much.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, claim that these concerns miss the mark. Some compatibilists hold this because they think the truth of causal determinism would not undermine our freedom to do otherwise (Berofsky 1987, Campbell 1997, Vihvelin 2013, etc.). As a result, these compatibilists tell us, the truth of causal determinism poses no threat to our status as morally responsible agents (notice the enthymematic premise here: the freedom to do otherwise is sufficient for the kind of control an agent must possess to be morally responsible for her actions).

Oh I see that's what you mean by "the ability to do otherwise", it's still wrong.

Again due to causality the future is as immutable as the past, you may very well suppose that you might have done something different in a past scenario but that's just wishful thinking. In reality you couldn't have done anything different because what you did was, to your mind, with the knowledge you had at the time, the best course of action to take.

Same scenario, same factors, same outcome.
1 + 1 = 2
No matter how many times you perform the same calculation until some part of the equation changes nothing has changed and if nothing has changed the outcome will be the same.

The ability to suppose you might have done something different is the illusion of choice, it's just wishful thinking.

 

[Old Things]

Again due to causality the future is as immutable as the past,

Yes, that seems to be your claim.

 

[Black Rose]

Causality is directly accountable because of free will. If I know what I am doing I am accountable for it. Gnosis.

 

[Black Rose]

 

[Old Things]

I feel as though there may be some overlap between the Dunning-Krugar effect and Free Will. For example, when you survey people, generally people think they have more control over what they do than they actually have. Now, this is not really a direct correlation because there are some very intelligent people who believe people have Libertarian Free Will (the position Cosmic Skeptic is attacking in the video). But most philosophers I think are generally Compatibilists. In this way, people in the know think people have less control over their actions than the general public. This doesn't account for Hard Determinists except to say Hard Determinists often put too little importance on people's ability to make choices.

 

[Cognisant]

You still don't understand what hard determinism is.

Riddle me this, can someone be morally accountable for their actions in a universe without causality? And if so, how?

 

[Old Things]

You still don't understand what hard determinism is.

Riddle me this, can someone be morally accountable for their actions in a universe without causality? And if so, how?

To the person who believes in LFW that is quite obvious. I would recommend for you the book "God, Freedom, and Evil" by Alvin Plantinga. It's short.

 

[Cognisant]

I'll just look up metaphysical libertarianism on Wikipedia, much easier than finding a specific book.

Most events can be explained as the effects of prior events. When a tree falls, it does so because of the force of the wind, its own structural weakness, and so on. However, when a person performs a free act, agent causation theorists say that the action was not caused by any other events or states of affairs, but rather was caused by the agent. Agent causation is ontologically separate from event causation. The action was not uncaused, because the agent caused it. But the agent's causing it was not determined by the agent's character, desires, or past, since that would just be event causation.[25] As Chisholm explains it, humans have "a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing – or no one – causes us to cause those events to happen."[26]

Actions are preceded by intentions and intentions are preceded by motivations.

Actions without intent are unintentional (i.e. accidental) therefore the actor is not accountable for them, though they may be accountable based prior actions, e.g. a drunk driver running someone over may not have intended to do it but they're still accountable for the negligence of drunk driving in the first place.

Intentions without motivations, that's software, that's what my smartphone does when it wakes me up with an alarm in the morning. Even if people were capable intention without motivation that raises another issue, how can there be evil without temptation?

It's falling to temptation that's the path to damnation but a prime mover cannot be tempted because they are by definition the unmoved mover. Also I'm pretty sure there can only be one prime mover, it's right there in the name "prime" mover, like you either have to be god or on par with god to be a prime mover.

Maybe I'm taking this all too literally, perhaps by "prime mover" they're just saying by having "the ability to do otherwise" the individual is able to act with self awareness rather than simply reacting to their circumstances. But again that's a misunderstanding of hard determinism, all exists within the scope of causality, there's no circumventing it and it doesn't in any way affect your ability to make choices or how you make them, it just means the choice you will make was always the choice you were going to make, just as the choices you do make will always be the choices you did make.

Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will have been created, referenced here as deliberative indeterminism, centred accounts, and efforts of will theory.[30] The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world.

Deliberative indeterminism asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process.[31][32] This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of luck (random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by Daniel Dennett[33] and John Martin Fischer.[34] An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model.

Centred accounts propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen.[35][36][37][38][39][40][41] An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision.

Efforts of will theory is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of volition have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of Robert Kane, where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort."[9] According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will.[42] An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see non-reductive physicalism).

Ah yes the quantum woo theories.

In short there's no escaping the necessity of causality because causality is a prerequisite of accountability and if there's no accountability free will is meaningless, but if there is causality then free will is impossible.
So free will is either meaningless and/or impossible.

Getting bored, this isn't an argument anymore I'm just pounding sand.

 

[Old Things]

I don't believe in LFW.

 

[scorpiomover]

"If you choose vanilla over chocolate, you have to want vanilla more than chocolate" requires that choice of vanilla over chocolate is pre-determined by some other factor, like that you want vanilla more than chocolate => this statement is only true if you assume that there is no free will when it comes to choosing vanilla over chocolate => assuming the consequent (fallacy).

 

[Cognisant]

Affirming the consequent only applies when there's another possible explanation.

If the lamp were broken, then the room would be dark.
The room is dark, so the lamp must be broken.

This is a fallacy because the lamp might be turned off, or stolen, or maybe there's a power outage, etc.

If you choose vanilla over chocolate, then you preferred vanilla to chocolate.
If you prefer vanilla to chocolate you will always choose vanilla over chocolate.

That would be affirming the consequent, I personally prefer vanilla but I don't always have vanilla because sometimes I want something different, it's probably something to do with how hungry I am and how chocolate icecream probably has more sugar to offset the natural bitterness of the chocolate.

If you choose vanilla over chocolate, you must have wanted vanilla more than chocolate.
You must want vanilla more than chocolate, if you choose vanilla over chocolate.

That's not affirming the consequent, that's just rephrasing the same statement.

 

[scorpiomover]

If you prefer vanilla to chocolate you will always choose vanilla over chocolate.

"Always"? How many people in the world have a favourite food, and have eaten nothing but their favourite food for their entire lives?

 

[scorpiomover]

If you choose vanilla over chocolate, you must have wanted vanilla more than chocolate.
You must want vanilla more than chocolate, if you choose vanilla over chocolate.

That's not affirming the consequent, that's just rephrasing the same statement.

Rephrasing = "saying the exact same thing in a different way".

So if you're rephasing "there is no free will", then you're saying "there is no free will => there is no free will."

 

[Old Things]

My view is more or less this:

P1) If humans’ perception is based on the truth, then they have free will.
P2) Humans’ perception is sometimes based on the truth.
C) Humans sometimes have free will.

Now, to note here is that we all have presuppositions or Schema that also shape how we see the world. It is when we come across "New" information that conflicts with our prior held Schema that we have to choose what to do with that "New" information. So things like what you eat for breakfast are out of our control, but we can choose the Schema we live by when "New" information presents itself. In this way, we can either choose what is True, what is False, or what we want to be True from this "New" information. And it is only when we choose what is True - usually at some cost to us - that we exercise our Free Will.

 

[Cognisant]

If you prefer vanilla to chocolate you will always choose vanilla over chocolate.

"Always"? How many people in the world have a favourite food, and have eaten nothing but their favourite food for their entire lives?

Yes, it's a fallacy, that was my point.

If you choose vanilla over chocolate, you must have wanted vanilla more than chocolate.
You must want vanilla more than chocolate, if you choose vanilla over chocolate.

That's not affirming the consequent, that's just rephrasing the same statement.

Rephrasing = "saying the exact same thing in a different way".

So if you're rephasing "there is no free will", then you're saying "there is no free will => there is no free will."

Yes that is the definition of rephrasing.
What is your point?

Now, to note here is that we all have presuppositions or Schema that also shape how we see the world. It is when we come across "New" information that conflicts with our prior held Schema that we have to choose what to do with that "New" information. So things like what you eat for breakfast are out of our control, but we can choose the Schema we live by when "New" information presents itself. In this way, we can either choose what is True, what is False, or what we want to be True from this "New" information. And it is only when we choose what is True - usually at some cost to us - that we exercise our Free Will.

Says the man trapped in denial, I've already explained to you why free will is axiomatically impossible, how it is invalidated by its own prerequisites, and your response to this been a series of fallacies.

You are trapped in denial, you're so heavily invested in your delusion you're incapable of accepting any truths that contradicts it regardless of how irrefutable they may be.

I'm pretty sure I know who I'm talking to, why did you come back?

 

[Old Things]

Says the man trapped in denial, I've already explained to you why free will is axiomatically impossible, how it is invalidated by its own prerequisites, and your response to this been a series of fallacies.

You are trapped in denial, you're so heavily invested in your delusion you're incapable of accepting any truths that contradicts it regardless of how irrefutable they may be.

I just gave my own view for the first time. So I am not sure how you have contradicted my view.

I'm kinda curious how you account for responsibility for people. Why should people go to jail for doing something wrong? I think this is something Cosmic Skeptic admits - that people are not responsible for their actions. Of course, this not only seems to go against common sense, but it also introduces absurdities in making sense of human behavior.

 

[Old Things]

I'm pretty sure I know who I'm talking to, why did you come back?

Not sure what you are talking about.

Who do you think I am?

 

[Cognisant]

I'm kinda curious how you account for responsibility for people. Why should people go to jail for doing something wrong?

Indeed from a hard determinism perspective there is no evil, only tragedy, but as we are not gods we cannot fix the abused childhood of a serial killer or the neurological disorders of the criminally insane, we can only do the best we can with the methods available and hope that someday we will be able to do better.

We put people in jail to protect society from them, to protect them from society and to protect them from themselves, and if we try really hard we can reform some of them or at least redirect them down a better path.

 

[Old Things]

I'm kinda curious how you account for responsibility for people. Why should people go to jail for doing something wrong?

Indeed from a hard determinism perspective there is no evil, only tragedy, but as we are not gods we cannot fix the abused childhood of a serial killer or the neurological disorders of the criminally insane, we can only do the best we can with the methods available and hope that someday we will be able to do better.

We put people in jail to protect society from them, to protect them from society and to protect them from themselves, and if we try really hard we can reform some of them or at least redirect them down a better path.

But how can there even be tragedy with your view? Or why should we even consider some things good and some things bad? These are values we place on things. And if everything is just a series of causation (which I think depends on how you parse that out) then nothing should be any more desirable than anything else. As Richard Dawkins would point out, "All that is left is blind pitiless indifference." Even our desires are an illusion with this view, not to mention that purpose doesn't exist. In other words, in your view, we should all be nihilistic hedonists. So that's fine if you want to believe that, but I personally don't think it leaves us with a thriving society.

 

[scorpiomover]

If you prefer vanilla to chocolate you will always choose vanilla over chocolate.

"Always"? How many people in the world have a favourite food, and have eaten nothing but their favourite food for their entire lives?

Yes, it's a fallacy, that was my point.

Your point was that people who prefer vanilla to chocolate, sometimes choose vanilla over chocolate, and sometimes choose chocolate over vanilla? That choices are not pre-determined?

If you choose vanilla over chocolate, you must have wanted vanilla more than chocolate.
You must want vanilla more than chocolate, if you choose vanilla over chocolate.

That's not affirming the consequent, that's just rephrasing the same statement.

Rephrasing = "saying the exact same thing in a different way".

So if you're rephasing "there is no free will", then you're saying "there is no free will => there is no free will."

Yes that is the definition of rephrasing.
What is your point?

It's circular reasoning, "A => A".
If A is true, then A => A and so A is true."
If A is false, then A => A and A is false.
Therefore, "A => A" implies nothing about the state of A, i.e.
"A => A" => A can be true and A can be false.
Therefore, this argument proves nothing about free will.

"If you choose vanilla over chocolate, you must have wanted vanilla more than chocolate." implies instead, where one makes deliberate choices, i.e. where one has reasoned out a particular choice by a pre-determined method, that the pre-determined method must exist, and must have existed prior to the pre-determined choice.

This in turn implis that all forms of pre-determination requires a finite chain of temporal regress.

This in turn implies that there must be an earlier point that lacks pre-determination, i.e. is not pre-determined.

 

[scorpiomover]

Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.

Then either:
1) Causality exists => free will does not exist => choice does not exist => making decisions of moral consequence is impossible.
2) Causality does not exist => making decisions of moral consequence is impossible.
Ergo, whether causality exists or not, in all situations, making decisions of moral consequence is impossible.

Also, either:
1) Causality exists => free will does not exist => everything is pre-determined => you cannot stop serial killers from killing people by locking them up.
2) Causality does not exist => there's no reason to think that locking up serial killers would cause them to kill less people.
Ergo, whether causality exists or not, in all situations, there's no reason to think that locking up serial killers would cause them to kill less people.

How can you justify serial killers being locked up?

 

[Old Things]

This in turn implis that all forms of pre-determination requires a finite chain of temporal regress.

This in turn implies that there must be an earlier point that lacks pre-determination, i.e. is not pre-determined.

This is very interesting to me. FMPOV, this is akin, in some sense, to an uncaused first cause. Many of the arguments for God are formulated in this way. The basic idea is that God did not have to create the universe, but he did. In this way, not only is the universe contingent on God, but the universe we live in today does not actually need to exist and could very well not have been.

 

[scorpiomover]

Free will is incompatible with causality and if the universe isn't causal making decisions of moral significance is impossible.

To have evidence indicating causality, one must show that in a given situation where A can happen and A can not happen, whenever A happens, B happens, and whenever A does not happen, B does not happen. If A and B are pre-determined by C, then A and B happened because of C. Thus, there is no proof that A =>B and no proof of causality between a and B. Thus, no free will => no evidence indicating any case of causality => no causality.

So free will is incompatible with causality =>there is no proof of any form of causality.

 

[Old Things]

So free will is incompatible with causality =>there is no proof of any form of causality.

To my mind, this starts to get very complicated very quickly. For example, from what you have said, it seems to imply if causality exists, then it would necessitate a B Theory of time (which is the view a lot of physicists take). The passage of time then is an illusion only based on our tiny brains trying to make sense of things as if the universe is shaking up a container of red and white balls and the different orientations of those balls are interpreted differently even though there are always the same amount of red and white balls in the container.

 

[Old Things]

@Cognisant,

It seems I don't really understand your view very well. What is throwing me off is that you seem to identify as a Hard Determinist, but your actual view is more like Compatibilism. So the question to ask you here is how does your view differ from Compatibilism? While you say (I think) humans are not responsible for their actions, your view of how we act in the world is more like what I described a Compatibilist would think. Could you help me understand your view better?

 

[Cognisant]

Free will practically speaking is whether or not you've been forced or tricked into doing something, e.g. if I rob a bank because someone is holding my family at gunpoint I didn't do it of my own free will.

Obviously god would agree with this, you didn't choose to rob the bank you chose to save your family.

But that's not what we're talking about, we're talking about whether someone can have free will relative to god's will, which is not to say when I scratch my ass god forced me to do it.

Rather because god is all powerful and all knowing, the creator of the universe, me, and my ass, then it's hardly fair for god to condemn me to hell for scratching my ass (assuming that's the 11th commandment, who knows what was on the other tablet) because by virtue of being omnipotent when god created the universe, me, and my ass, he knew that my ass would become itchy and I would scratch it.

TL;DR If god is omnipotent and god made me and I am flawed then I am flawed by design because god made me and god is omnipotent and therefore incapable of failure.

 

[Cognisant]

To have evidence indicating causality, one must show that in a given situation where A can happen and A can not happen, whenever A happens, B happens, and whenever A does not happen, B does not happen.

Ok I think I understand that, except proving a negative is impossible so we can never prove causality (or anything at all for that matter) in the absolute sense, just as there could theoretically be a unicorn standing behind me right now (despite a myriad of reasons why that's astronomically unlikely) hence why absolute proof is never really required to prove something, you only need to prove it beyond all reasonable doubt.

However that is not to say that absolute proof doesn't exist, you can have axiomatic proof where the proof is a direct consequence of the question, e.g. 1 + 1 = 2, the only way the answer could not be true would be if you changed or redefined some part of the equation at which point it's not the answer that has changer but rather the question.

I cannot prove that all events are causal, for all I know it could just be an incredible coincidence that all events thus far have occurred in an apparently causal manner and that the universe isn't actually causal at all, but this is hardly a reasonable doubt to have.

I can however axiomatically prove that free will doesn't exist because free will is the ability to perform an action that can be judged by god, but the ability to perform actions of moral consequence necessitates a causal relationship between action and consequence. So causality is a prerequisite of free will but the existence of causality also invalidates free will (for the reasons stated in my prior post) UNLESS you're willing to concede that god is not omnipotent.

If A and B are pre-determined by C, then A and B happened because of C. Thus, there is no proof that A =>B and no proof of causality between a and B. Thus, no free will => no evidence indicating any case of causality => no causality.

So free will is incompatible with causality =>there is no proof of any form of causality.

You're use of "=>" is giving me syntax errors, I cannot compute this "logic"?

 

[scorpiomover]

To have evidence indicating causality, one must show that in a given situation where A can happen and A can not happen, whenever A happens, B happens, and whenever A does not happen, B does not happen.

Ok I think I understand that, except proving a negative is impossible so we can never prove causality (or anything at all for that matter) in the absolute sense, just as there could theoretically be a unicorn standing behind me right now (despite a myriad of reasons why that's astronomically unlikely) hence why absolute proof is never really required to prove something, you only need to prove it beyond all reasonable doubt.

We HAVE reasonable evidence for indeterminism, from the double-slit experiment.

When we fire a laser through a set of slits, and we don't know which of the slits each photon went through, the photons form a wave pattern, which is what happens with indeterminism.

Then when we add to our experiment by measuring which of the slits each photon went through, by adding a photon detector on one of the slits, the photons form a blob, which is what happens with pre-determination.

Many quantum-level particle reactions act as if superposition occurs temporarily. Then when a measurement is taken, the superposition decoheres to a singular result that matches the measurement.

So you get free will, but with a time limit on any one choice.

Someone might find themselves with a loaded gun on a dark night where his enemy is coming the other way, and there's no-one else around for miles. But that won't happen every day.

Someone might meet the love of their life. But she's not going to wait around forever to be asked out.

Someone might need your help. But if you take 3 weeks to get around to helping him, you may find out that your friend has already done it himself, or got someone else to help him.

Usually, the point at which things switch is the point of quantum decoherence, i.e. when someone in the world "measures" the state of the situation, and then proceeds to pursue resolving the situation himself/herself.

However that is not to say that absolute proof doesn't exist, you can have axiomatic proof where the proof is a direct consequence of the question, e.g. 1 + 1 = 2, the only way the answer could not be true would be if you changed or redefined some part of the equation at which point it's not the answer that has changer but rather the question.

I cannot prove that all events are causal, for all I know it could just be an incredible coincidence that all events thus far have occurred in an apparently causal manner and that the universe isn't actually causal at all, but this is hardly a reasonable doubt to have.

I would say that someone who grew up with zero tech in the jungle, would have a better understanding of the level of naturally-occuring causality in the world.

Most of our causality was designed and re-designed by humans over many years to be act in a consistently causal manner. It took 10 years to take the prototype of a transistor and make it reliable. Once it had almost 100% reliability in any situation where it could be used, it could be relied upon to not make an error, which made it highly useful in millions of situations. Our houses are designed to link into the water pipes, sewage pipes, electricity cables and telephone cables, and so are designed to be integrated into the infrastructure of our countries.

I can however axiomatically prove that free will doesn't exist because free will is the ability to perform an action that can be judged by god,

Now you're moving the goalposts. You're defining "free will" as "accountable by G-d". You can have the freedom to choose to eat strawberry jam or apricot jam, and still be just as unaccountable.

but the ability to perform actions of moral consequence necessitates a causal relationship between action and consequence. So causality is a prerequisite of free will but the existence of causality also invalidates free will (for the reasons stated in my prior post) UNLESS you're willing to concede that god is not omnipotent.

Well, not really. If there's 0% causality, then there's no reason to suppose moral consequences, and no reason to hold back. If there's 100% causality, that's like being shot in the head. Anyone who ignores that level of causality is seriously mentally/physically ill.

Moral choices are cases where some of the time, the moral consequences occur, amd some of the time, they don't. You know you shouldn't do it. But maybe this time, you'll get away with it.

If A and B are pre-determined by C, then A and B happened because of C. Thus, there is no proof that A =>B and no proof of causality between a and B. Thus, no free will => no evidence indicating any case of causality => no causality.

So free will is incompatible with causality =>there is no proof of any form of causality.

You're use of "=>" is giving me syntax errors, I cannot compute this "logic"?

Here:

If A and B are pre-determined by C, then A and B happened because of C. Thus, there is no proof that A causes B and no proof of causality between A and B. Thus, no free will means that there is no evidence indicating any case of causality, which means there is no reason to think any form of causality exists.

So "free will is incompatible with causality" implies that there is no proof of any form of causality.